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Mapping Digital Media
Th e values that underpin good journalism, the need of citizens for reliable and abundant information, and 
the importance of such information for a healthy society and a robust democracy: these are perennial, and 
provide compass-bearings for anyone trying to make sense of current changes across the media landscape. 
Th e standards in the profession are in the process of being set. Most of the eﬀ ects on journalism imposed 
by new technology are shaped in the most developed societies, but these changes are equally inﬂ uencing the 
media in less developed societies.
Th e Mapping Digital Media project, which examines the changes in-depth, aims to build bridges between 
researchers and policymakers, activists, academics and standard-setters across the world. It also builds policy 
capacity in countries where this is less developed, encouraging stakeholders to participate and inﬂ uence 
change. At the same time, this research creates a knowledge base, laying foundations for advocacy work, 
building capacity and enhancing debate. 
Th e Media Program of the Open Society Foundations has seen how changes and continuity aﬀ ect the media in 
diﬀ erent places, redeﬁ ning the way they can operate sustainably while staying true to values of pluralism and 
diversity, transparency and accountability, editorial independence, freedom of expression and information, 
public service, and high professional standards.
Th e Mapping Digital Media project assesses, in the light of these values, the global opportunities and risks 
that are created for media by the following developments:
 the switch-over from analog broadcasting to digital broadcasting;
 growth of new media platforms as sources of news;
 convergence of traditional broadcasting with telecommunications.
Covering 60 countries, the project examines how these changes aﬀ ect the core democratic service that any 
media system should provide—news about political, economic and social aﬀ airs. 
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Th e Mapping Digital Media reports are produced by local researchers and partner organizations in each 
country. Cumulatively, these reports will provide a much-needed resource on the democratic role of digital 
media.
In addition to the country reports, the Open Society Media Program has commissioned research papers on a 
range of topics related to digital media. Th ese papers are published as the MDM Reference Series.
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Mapping Digital Media: Turkey
Executive Summary
Th ere is a strong appetite for digital media in Turkey. Th e reach of the internet—both ﬁ xed line and mobile—
has expanded dramatically in recent years, connecting nearly half the population, although broadband access 
lags some way behind. 
Digital broadcasting is limited to the dominant satellite platform, whilst progress towards digital terrestrial 
services has been negligible. Switch-over is due to be completed by 2014 but the process has been obstructed 
by a lack of transparency, public consultation, or a convergent regulatory framework. Progress towards digital 
radio has been hampered by reluctance among broadcasters to shoulder the additional costs of upgrading 
their services in the face of declining audiences. (Between 2005 and 2008, the reach of radio amongst the 
population fell from 75 to 68 percent.) 
Television remains by far the dominant news medium. Since the public broadcaster lost its monopoly in 
1990, the number of news outlets has proliferated, driven by the expansion of cable and satellite platforms. 
According to the government’s Directorate General of Press and Information, there were 258 television 
channels in Turkey in 2008, of which 27 were national, 16 regional, and 215 local. But growth in the number 
of channels has not produced a signiﬁ cant shift in viewership away from traditional news bulletins. In 2009, 
94 percent of adults still regularly watched the news programs of the ﬁ ve most popular channels. 
Moreover, diversity in content is limited and there are concerns that the culture of immediacy in news 
provision has fostered growing homogenization. Recent moves to relax regulation on foreign ownership and 
the entrance of Al Jazeera Turkey in particular are seen as potentially positive developments in this respect. 
But it remains to be seen whether this, or digitization of broadcasting, will result in a more or less diverse 
news oﬀ er on television.
Beyond television, the relatively strong demand for online news is reﬂ ected in the growth of established 
newspaper brands online, as well as of ‘pure play’ news websites. Recent survey data suggest that up to 60 
percent of internet users regularly access online news services. However, as with television, the multiplication 
7O P E N  S O C I E T Y  M E D I A  P R O G R A M     2 0 1 2
of news sources belies a structural trend towards homogenization of content, reﬂ ected in a burgeoning ‘copy-
paste’ culture of recycled journalism. 
Newspapers are still an important source of news, however, reaching 4.6 million people (predominantly in 
Istanbul and other urban centers) and with circulations and advertising revenues remaining relatively stable 
over the last decade. A declining share of the advertising market is nevertheless perceived as an ominous sign 
for the future sustainability of the print news sector. Perhaps because of this, there is little appetite to invest 
in analysis and in-depth coverage. Th is has fostered a rise in opinion journalism, mirroring the blogosphere 
culture, where columnists are given more credit than correspondents. 
But the most signiﬁ cant threat to news diversity and quality remains the repressive legal restrictions under 
which journalists operate. If anything, this has intensiﬁ ed in response to the rise of digital media. Article 301 
of the Turkish Penal Code, making it illegal to insult Turkey and national identity, has been used as a cover 
for internet censorship (notably in the banning of video-sharing website YouTube for more than two years 
between 2008 and 2010). But it is anti-terror laws which pose the most serious threat to journalism and 
free speech online. In 2011, 14 defendants from a news website called Oda TV were jailed on accusations of 
reporting and writing in the service of an alleged terrorist conspiracy known as Ergenekon. 
Th e indictment did trigger wide-scale public outrage and waves of protest, however, suggesting that the battle 
over free speech online has not necessarily been won by the government. Certainly the internet has provided 
new opportunities for public discussion of sensitive social and political issues such as the Armenian genocide, 
Kurdish nationalism, homosexuality, and conscientious objection which are otherwise sidestepped by the 
conventional media. 
Th e speedy dissemination of documents or leaked information has been a key weapon in the armory of digital 
activists in Turkey. An unpublished book by an investigative journalist behind bars was leaked on the internet 
and shared via Twitter in 2011. Ahmet Şık’s İmam’ın Ordusu (Th e Imam’s Army) was characterized by the 12th 
Court for Serious Crimes in Istanbul as an “illegal organizational document.” Th e court ruled that anyone 
refusing to hand in copies of the book would be accused of “supporting a criminal organization.” But this 
did little to stem the book’s dissemination online, indicating obscure relations between the Gülen Islamist 
community and the police, and its possible embedding in the Turkish security forces.
Government control of the media has been extended through less direct means, notably via the market. In 
particular, recent mergers and acquisitions by Çalık Group, a pro-government conglomerate, have aroused 
controversy not least because they were partly funded by state banks. On the whole, there are strong indicators 
of political parallelism in both print and broadcasting sectors, and digitization appears to have had little if 
any eﬀ ect on this. 
In broadcasting, this parallelism is sustained largely between the public and commercial broadcasters with the 
former viewed by supporters of the ruling party as the most reliable source of news and as a vehicle for state 
propaganda by supporters of the opposition. Th e report makes clear however that political parallelism should 
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not be equated with political diversity as both pro- and anti-government outlets tend to fall into line on key 
issues, particularly relating to Turkish nationalism and security.
Nor has digitization done much to alter the market dominance of a handful of media conglomerates, and 
concentration looks set to increase with the relaxation of rules on foreign ownership of Turkish media outlets. 
Many of the most popular digital news outlets still belong to major conglomerates such as Doğan Medya Grup, 
although the monopolistic structure has been challenged somewhat by the recent emergence of Habertürk, a 
new conglomerate with cross-media assets. Th e attraction of political inﬂ uence through the media has meant 
that many outlets are cross-subsidized and run as loss leaders but a lack of transparency of ownership has 
obscured funding sources, as well as the precise relationships among the political establishment, the Islamic 
networks, and media conglomerates. 
In line with other countries, the provision of free content online has made it diﬃ  cult for newspaper publishers 
to monetize digital news content. Some have opted to reproduce print editions in their entirety to try and 
maximize online advertising revenue. Others are more cautious, suggesting that some sort of subscription 
model is the solution. One low-budget daily national newspaper has begun mandatory online subscription 
for its readers although the sustainability of this model is still unclear.
Th e future funding of the public service broadcaster is another open question. While this report suggests 
that it will depend for the foreseeable future on a combination of advertising revenue and a levy applied to 
household electricity bills, waning public support and declining audiences may be ominous signs for public 
service broadcasting (PSB) in Turkey. PSB oﬃ  cials explain that the sector plays a key role in the government’s 
digital switch-over plans which could potentially improve engagement with their audience and the recovery 
of ratings that are being lost to commercial rivals. However, they have not provided any information on 
anticipated digital services, which epitomizes the organization’s lack of transparency and the closed-door 
nature of switch-over policy in general.
On the whole, media policy and regulation have been relatively unresponsive to the challenges posed by 
digitization. Regulatory authority is still split between broadcasting and telecoms agencies and recent changes 
in the law have not suﬃ  ciently adapted the spectrum allocation process to the speciﬁ c issues and nuances 
associated with digital licensing. Th is unresponsiveness has been coupled with a dearth of public consultations 
and transparency in the digital policy process. Of particular concern for the authors of this report is the power 
vested in the telecoms authority to ban websites considered to host inappropriate content without recourse 
to judicial proceedings. 
In light of this, the report calls for a host of measures aimed at depoliticizing the policy process in respect of 
digitization, strengthening legislative protections against digital censorship, and enhancing the transparency 
and accountability of regulatory institutions. 
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Context
Turkey is considered to be the world’s 15th and Europe’s 6th biggest economy, with 8.9 percent growth in 
2010. Th e Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) predicts that Turkey will 
overtake India as the second-fastest growing economy by 2017, and become the second-largest economy in 
Europe by 2050.1 
As a founding member of the OECD and G20 group of countries, Turkey successfully overcame the negative 
consequences of its economic crisis in 2001, and reduced its inﬂ ation rate from 18.4 percent in 2003 to 9.3 
percent in 2004. Nevertheless, unemployment reached a historic high in 2009, up to 12.3 percent from 10.6 
percent in 2008. Economic growth was also around 0.5 percent in the third quarter of 2009, the lowest rate 
in the last six years. 
One of the government’s major economic concerns is the budget deﬁ cit, which was one of the main topics 
of the 2011 national budget talks. A decrease in the national budget deﬁ cit was observed with a 25 percent 
drop from 2009 to 2010, and in December 2010, the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, expressed 
his expectations of a further decrease in 2011. Inﬂ ation also reached its lowest point for 40 years when it 
sank below 4 percent in March 2011. Like many emerging economies, Turkey relies heavily on its dynamic 
population growth, where one-quarter of its residents are less than 15 years of age, while just 6 percent are 
over 65 in a population of 72 million.
In 2008, exports were recorded as US$ 141.8 billion, while the larger imports such as pharmaceuticals, 
cosmetic products, and chemicals used in cleaning and food processing reached US$ 204.8 billion. Talks 
were expected to open in 2007 on the Economic and Monetary Policy acquis chapter of Turkey’s accession to 
the EU, but were postponed due to the French government’s concerns. Although Turkey was assessed by the 
European Parliament as having complied fully with the Copenhagen Criteria, debates over Turkish accession 
continue, stoked by recent domestic political controversies, economic conditions, and the dominant role of 
1. Hürriyet, “Türkiye, 2050’de dünya ikincisi olacak” (Turkey to become the 2nd largest economy in Europe in 2050), 1 December 2011, at http://
hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=19363894&yazarid=44 (accessed 17 March 2012).
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the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP),2 which won landslide victories in the 
general elections in 2002 and 2007, and was granted observer membership in the center-right European 
People’s Party in 2005.
Th e media sector has been adapting to new technology, embracing online opportunities to reach larger 
audiences. While the lack of diversity in media ownership and regulatory restrictions over the contents of 
analog and digital television channels are persistent problems, they are often ignored by the audience due to 
the low level of media literacy. 
Th e rising popularity of blogs, online news websites, and forums are believed to provide new grounds 
for serving diﬀ erent tastes with easy access to online domestic and global services. Some of these services 
encourage their visitors to participate, though user-generated content, in sharing and creating information 
and data. Further practices for technological and functional compliance with digital are expected to bring 
legislative and executive practices onto the public policy agenda, in order to create a legal framework and 
regulate the digitization process and beyond.
2. One of the primary political actions of the AKP was its involvement in the Ergenekon Operation, through which the members of the alleged 
ultra-nationalist Kemalist organization were charged in 2007. Th e Turkey 2010 Progress Report: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges, 
accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, stated that the large number of jour-
nalists charged during the Ergenekon case has been a major concern in terms of its potential negative inﬂ uence on the democratic nature of the 
Republic of Turkey. It is also argued that the primary aim of the Ergenekon operation is to silence opponents of the AKP, as well as supporters 
of the Gülen Movement, a transnational civic society movement led by the Muslim theologian Fethullah Gülen.
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Social Indicators
Population: 74.8 million (2009)
Households: 14.663 million (2010)
Figure 1. 
Rural–urban breakdown (% of total population)
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, Turkey Statistical Yearbook (Türkiye Istatistik Yilliği), Istanbul, 2010.
Figure 2.
Ethnic composition (% of total population), 2008
Note: Minority groups include Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Jews, and Dönme (a small, separate group of Muslims, concentrated 
in Edirne and Istanbul, whose forbears converted from Judaism).
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Linguistic composition 
Th e oﬃ  cial language is Turkish. Kurdish, Arabic, Armenian, and Greek are also used. Th e Latin alphabet has 
been in use since it superseded the Arabic alphabet in 1928.3
Figure 3.
Religious composition (% of total population)
Note: Muslims are mostly Sunni though 10–25 percent of Muslims belong to the non-orthodox Alevi community. “Other” 
includes Christians (Greek Orthodox and Armenian Apostolic) and Jews.4
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, Turkey Statistical Yearbook (Türkiye Istatistik Yilliği), Istanbul, 2010.
Muslims (99%)
Other (1%)
3. Th e Oﬃ  ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Country Proﬁ le, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
country,,,COUNTRYPROF,TUR,4562d8cf2,46f9135d0,0.html (accessed 3 December 2011).
4. Th e Oﬃ  ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Country Proﬁ le, at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,
COUNTRYPROF,TUR,4562d8cf2,46f9135d0,0.html (accessed 3 December 2011).




2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GDP (current prices), 
total in US$ million
482.6 529.1 649.1 730.3 614.4 741.8 797.6 876.5
GDP (current prices), 
per head in US$
7,108 7,766 9,422 10,484 8,711 10,398 11,054 12,012
Gross National Income (GNI) 
(current $), per head
6,200 7,150 8,090 8,890 8,700 9,500 n/a n/a
Unemployment 
(% of total labor force)
10.5 10.2 10.2 10.9 14.0 11.8 11.4 11.0
Inﬂ ation6 (average annual rate 
in % against previous year)
7.7 9.6 8.3 10.0 6.5 6.4 7.0 5.4
Notes: Th e indicators for 2012 are forecasts by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
n/a: not available.
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF) (GDP, unemployment and inﬂ ation ﬁ gures); World Bank (GNI) (2011).
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1. Media Consumption: 
 The Digital Factor
1.1 Digital Take-up
1.1.1 Digital Equipment
Digital broadcasting is in its infancy in Turkey, where switch-over is due to be completed by 2014. Th ere 
is little information available on the main digital terrestrial television reception, which indicates that digital 
broadcasting has started to overtake analog among Turkish households. (See Table 2.) Moreover, much of 
the domestic equipment required for reception of digital media is in place: most Turks are only a set-top box 
away from being able to receive digital broadcasts once they become available on a nationwide terrestrial 
platform. 
 
Almost all households have at least one television set (11 percent have three or more), most have radios 
(although statistics are not available), and some 40 percent have a PC and access to the internet. Th ere are 
nine mobile phones for every 10 Turks. Th e main means of receiving television are terrestrial, satellite, and 
cable. Radio transmission is mostly terrestrial.
Average internet use in Turkey exceeds one hour a day. Th e information society branch of the Ministry of 
Development reported that 73 percent of users logged on to check email, 64 percent visited chat rooms, 
online forums, and interactive news sites, 59 percent read news, 56 percent searched for information about 
goods and services, and 51 percent for downloading games, music and ﬁ lms.5
5. Ministry of Development, “Bilgi Toplumu Raporu” (Information Society Report), 2011, at http://www.dpt.gov.tr/DocObjects/View/12808/
Bilgi_Toplumu_Istatistikleri_2011.pdf (accessed 4 December 2011).
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Table 2.
Households owing equipment, 2005–2010































TV set 11,588 100 15,196 100 16,592 100 14,072 100 14,266 100 14,663 100
PC 1,390 12 2,735 18 2,986 27 3,799 32 5,278 37 6,451 44
Notes: HH: households owning the equipment; THH: total number of households in the country; PC: personal computer.
Sources: Turkish Statistical Institute, Turkey Statistical Yearbook (Türkiye Istatistik Yilliği), Istanbul, 2010.
1.1.2 Platforms
Th e most important platforms for television reception are still terrestrial (23.6 percent) and satellite (70.4 
percent ownership), though there is also a substantial cable presence (7.2 percent ownership). With the 
emergence of satellite services that oﬀ ered high-deﬁ nition (HD) broadcasts and thematic channels at the 
beginning of the 2000s, there has been a rising shift in satellite subscriptions instead of receiving terrestrial 
television services. Digiturk (Çukurova Group), D-Smart (Doğan Media Group, DMG), and the cable 
television service Türksat (national services) are the three main satellite platforms in the country.8 D-Smart 
had 1.09 million subscribers by the end of 2009, of which 276,000 were pay-TV subscribers. According to 
the data collected by the Radio and Television Supreme Council (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu, RTÜK) 
in June 2010, there were a total of 1,174,000 analog subscribers, and 120,000 digital cable households. 
(See Table 3.)
Th e public service broadcaster, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon 
Kurumu, TRT), started test digital broadcasting from Istanbul in 2006. In October 2009, a draft new 
Broadcasting Law on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and their Media Services was 
also submitted to Parliament and the bill was last updated in November 2010 (see section 6.1.1). Th e law is 
to serve the implementation of the European Union’s Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD), and 
addresses issues such as switch-over to digital terrestrial television and new broadcasting technologies, like 
IPTV, DVB-H, and HDTV. In regard to current IPTV services, TTNET, a subsidiary of Türk Telekom, 
launched a test service called IP Tivibu in September 2010, which includes 101 national and foreign channels, 
as well as 10 HD channels. TTNET also oﬀ ers the online Tivibu combining streamed VOD and TV services.
Radio is well established: currently there are 36 national, 108 regional, and 944 local radio stations. 
6. Total number of households owning the equipment.
7. Percentage of total number of households in the country.
8. MAVISE Database, at http://mavise.obs.coe.int/country?id=32 (accessed November 2011).
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In 2002, the TRT launched DAB test transmissions in Band III to reach approximately 2 million listeners. 
With the addition of a 1KW transmitter, the single-frequency network was announced to be introduced to 
stations in Istanbul. Th e single-frequency network is expected to result in the eﬃ  cient use of radio spectrum 
and expansion of the coverage of digital terrestrial broadcasting. However, no oﬃ  cial statement has yet been 
made on introducing the new transmitter, or on applying the single-frequency network. 
Radio stations have also been slow to take up digital technology due to its high cost given declining radio 
audiences.
Table 3. 
Platform for the main TV reception and digital take-up, 2005–20109































Terrestrial reception 8,074 69.6 7,773 51.0 6,846 41.1 4,667 33.1 3,794 26.6 3,460 23.6
– of which digital n/a
Cable TV reception 1,165 10.0 1,442 9.0 1,233 7.3 1,098 7.8 1,028 7.2 1,059 7.2
– of which digital n/a
Satellite reception 2,375 20.4 6,081 40.0 8,580 51.6 8,340 59.1 9,485 66.4 10,329 70.4
– of which digital 2,375 20.4 6,081 40.0 8,580 51.6 8,340 59.1 9,485 66.4 10,329 70.4
Total 11,614 100.0 15,296 100.0 16,659 100.0 14,105 100.0 14,307 100.0 14,848 100.0
– of which digital 2,375 20.4 6,081 40.0 8,580 51.6 8,340 59.1 9,485 66.4 10,329 70.4
Notes: HH: Households owning the equipment; TVHH: Total number of households in the country; n/a: not available.
Source: Médiamétrie/Eurodata TV Worldwide, 2010.
According to the “Digital Technology Use in 2010” survey by the Turkish Statistical Institute (Türkiye 
İstatistik Kurumu, TÜİK), 42.9 percent of households had access to the internet,10 while a 2010 report by the 
telecommunications regulator, the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (Bilgi İletişim 
ve Teknolojileri Kurumu, BTK), put the number of internet users in Turkey at 35 million, 45 percent of the 
population.11
Th e pattern of telecoms usage has changed signiﬁ cantly in recent years as people have moved from ﬁ xed line 
to mobile telephony. According to the BTK, the number of ﬁ xed-line subscribers fell from 19 million in 2004 
to 16 million in 2010. Th e most recent data (late 2009) show that the number of mobile phone subscribers 
9. Th e ﬁ gures refer to the main TV set in the households which are multi-TV households.
10. See http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?tb_id=60&ust_id=2 (accessed 2 November 2011).
11. Information and Communication Technologies Authority (Bilgi İletişim ve Teknolojileri Kurumu, BTK), Th ird Quarterly Market Report on Elec-
tronic Communication Sector in Turkey, November 2010, at http://www.theBTK.gov.tr/Yayin/pv/ucaylik10_3.pdf (accessed 2 February 2011) 
(hereafter BTK, Th ird Quarterly Market Report on Electronic Communication Sector).
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was 63 million. Th e mobile market leader, Turkcell, had 35 million subscribers, Vodafone 16 million, and 
Avea 12 million. In December 2010, the total number of 3G subscribers exceeded 7 million. Th e mobile 
penetration rate in Turkey was over 91 percent in 2010. (See Table 4.)
Table 4. 
Internet penetration rate (total internet subscriptions as % of total population) 
and mobile penetration rate (total active SIM cards as % of total population), 2005–2010
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Internet 3.3 4.4 19.7 25.4 41.6 42.9
 of which broadband 2.2 3.8 6.5 7.7 8.5 n/a
Mobile telephony12 72.6 87.4 88.1 87.6 90.5 91.9
 of which 3G 0 0 0 0 3.2 12.6
Sources: TÜİK (internet and broadband); BTK (on mobile telephony and 3G penetration).
However, despite the frequent recycling of news content on digital platforms, the web portals are main news 
providers for the population of Turkey. Th e İPSOS KMG report on internet use in 2009 revealed that 58.5 
percent of users read online news on a daily basis.13 
1 .2 Media Preferences 
 1.2.1 Main Shifts in Media Consumption
Th e state’s monopoly over broadcasting lasted until 1990. Since then, TV news outlets have proliferated. 
News is currently carried by the public service broadcaster, TRT, and by several other commercial providers. 
Television is the main news medium in Turkey. Th ere have not been any shifts away from traditional bulletins 
towards rolling news channels. Th e mainstream television channels Kanal D, Show TV, and ATV broadcast 
the most popular TV news.14 According to the broadcasting watchdog, RTÜK, 94 percent of adults watched 
TV news programs in 2009.15 
Assessing the importance of radio as a news source is quite diﬃ  cult due to declining listenership. According 
to a 2009 report by Ipsos KMG,16 radio listening fell from 75 percent of the population in 2005 to 68 percent 
in 2008. 
12. BTK, Th ird Quarterly Market Report on Electronic Communication Sector. 
13. Ipsos KMG, İnternet Kullanım Alışkanlıkları Raporu, 2009 (Report on Internet Usage Habits), at http://www.ipsos-kmg.com/node/789 
(accessed 03 February 2011) (hereafter Ipsos KMG, İnternet Kullanım Alışkanlıkları Raporu).
14. Ipsos KMG, İnternet Kullanım Alışkanlıkları Raporu.
15. See the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) report, “Television Viewing Tendencies,” February 2009, at http://www.rtuk.org.tr/
sayfalar/English.aspx (accessed May 2011) (hereafter RTÜK, “Television Viewing Tendencies”).
16. Ipsos KMG, Radio Listenership Annual Measurement System Report, 2009, Istanbul.
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Th e growing number and increasing popularity of online news portals, as well as the news websites of daily 
papers, are usually considered as primary drivers of digital migration. Newspapers are still an important 
source of news, however, both in print and online. Daily newspaper sales remained almost stable in the ﬁ rst 
decade of the 2000s, despite a slight decrease during the second half. Weekly overall newspaper sales are 
approximately 4.6 million, and newspaper websites enjoy large readerships. (See Tables 6 and 7.)
Although online news readership has not harmed the sales of daily newspapers, the Ipsos KMG ﬁ ndings reveal 
that “reading/following news websites” is the most popular activity among internet users who habitually read 
news online. According to this research, conducted in April 2010, 36.2 percent of internet users spent the 
majority of their time online reading news.17
Other trends in news readership have also emerged with the rising popularity of web portals such as Mynet.
com, Haberler.com, and Ensonhaber.com. Launched in 1998, Mynet.com was one of the ﬁ rst news and 
entertainment web portals in Turkey, and achieved a loyal audience that has placed it among the most 
popular news web portals. Ekolay.com, another web portal, launched by Doğan Media Group (DMG), also 
draws a considerable amount of readers with its emphasis on entertainment and lifestyle content. Other 
popular portals such as Haberler.com and Ensonhaber.com oﬀ er a compilation of news provided by daily 
newspapers, although without any references. 
Th ere have also been major changes in terms of news and information consumption in Turkey which are 
directly linked with digital migration. In addition to news consumption, nearly 27,050 manuscripts and 
10,000 magazines of the National Library have been transferred into digital forms and oﬀ ered online as a 
part of the EU’s digital library project, Europena. For the ﬁ rst time in the country’s cultural history, images, 
paintings, maps, voice recordings, and newspapers were accessible to the public due to digitization.18 Th ese 
kinds of digitization projects make a major impact on the research patterns of journalists, researchers, and 
students and improve the accessibility of media sources.
1.2.2 Availability of a Diverse Range of News Sources
According to the government Directorate General of Press and Information (Başbakanlık Basın-Yayın ve 
Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü), there were 258 television channels in Turkey in 2008, of which 27 were 
national, 16 regional, and 215 local. Sixty-ﬁ ve of these channels were available on cable and 92 on satellite. 
According to the ratings of September 2010, Kanal D, ATV, NTV, CNN Türk, and Habertürk are the top 
ﬁ ve on the list, with TRT lagging far behind.19
17. Ipsos KMG, PC and Internet Penetration Data Analysis, April 2010, Istanbul.
18. Hürriyet Daily News, “Turkey’s National Library included in the EU Project,” 25 January 2011, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.
com/n.php?n=0124102043618-2011-01-24 (accessed 14 November 2011).
19. E. Elmas and D. Kurban, İletişimsel Demokrasi-Demokratik İletişim: Türkiye’de Medya—Mevzuat, Politikalar, Aktörler (Communicative Democ-
racy-Democratic Commıunication: Media in Turkey—Regulations, Politics and Actors), TESEV Yayınları, İstanbul, 2011.
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Th ere are many well-established oﬄ  ine news outlets oﬀ ering a diverse range of news content. Prominent 
oﬄ  ine news agencies include Anadolu Ajansı (AA), Doğan Haber Ajansı (DHA), İhlas Haber Ajansı (İHA), 
Cihan Haber Ajansı (CİHA), and ANKA, which have high-tech facilities and a large staﬀ .
Every national news outlet has its own website, providing up-to-date news, commentaries, columns, and 
blogs by their visitors. Th anks to the popularity of online editions of daily newspapers and independent web 
portals, online news sources have emerged as an alternative to traditional news media. However, it is still 
hard to talk about diversity and new methods of original news-making used by online journalists, due to the 
prevalence of copy-and-paste practices online (see section 4.1.1).
Table 5.
Th e largest TV channels by audience share, 2010
TV channel Audience share (%) Rating (%)
Kanal D 13.9 27.9 
Show 11.0 4.6 
ATV 9.8 23.8 
Star 9.1 25.1 
Fox 7.5 9.7 
Samanyolu TV 5.8 n/a
Kanal 7 4.8 2.2 
TRT-1 3.3 n/a
Habertürk 1.8 n/a
Cine 5 1.1 33.8 
Note: n/a: not available.
Source: IP Network/TV KeyFacts 2010.20
Th e major private television channels (see Table 5) in Turkey are ATV, Kanal D, Show TV, Star TV, and Fox 
TV, oﬀ ering an amalgam of entertainment and news content. Kanal D is primarily an entertainment channel 
carrying domestic television serials during primetime. Th ese serials attract a large number of audiences in 
the country and also in the Arab world. Show TV, ATV, and Star TV are also mainly entertainment channels 
broadcasting quiz shows, dramas, sitcoms, sensational news, and debate programs. Star TV and ATV are 
clearly pro-government channels and do not give any air time to the opposition’s views. Samanyolu TV and 
Kanal 7 are channels with an Islamist ideological orientation, positioning themselves as religious conservative. 
Th e diversity of news content in the mainstream media is highly deceptive due to the concentration of 
ownership and government partisanship, and can hardly be attributed to digitization over the last ﬁ ve years. 
20. Television International Key Facts Website, available at: http://www.ip-network.com/rd/htm/tvkeyfacts.aspx (accessed 2 March 2011).
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Although there are a considerable number of broadcast news sources, most television channels imitate the 
program content of the most watched news channels, which results in homogenization of news content 
across diﬀ erent outputs. 
1.3. News Providers
1.3.1 Leading Sources of News
1. 3.1.1 Print Media
Newspapers are still an important source of news, despite the low circulation ﬁ gures. Th e Directorate General 
of Press and Information reportedly stated in 2008 that there were 2,459 newspapers, of which 55 were 
national, 23 regional, and 2,381 local.21
Th e most read daily newspapers are Zaman, Posta, and Hürriyet (see Table 6). Recent changes in ownership 
structure and the emergence of new actors such as Ciner Yayın Holding, which started publishing the daily 
paper Habertürk in March 2009, have challenged the highly concentrated structure of the media in Turkey, 
and the dominance of several main players such as DMG. Th e emergence of new actors in the press sector 
has not had a substantial inﬂ uence on newspaper sales. Only slight losses were observed due to the rising 
popularity of oﬃ  cial websites of daily newspapers oﬀ ering free content to the audience.22
Table 6.
Newspaper circulation ﬁ gures (average monthly paid circulation, ranked by 2010 circulation), 2005–2010
Title 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Zaman 523,138 577,783 617,212 751,976 768,051 778,918
Posta 623,651 663,527 641,317 637,267 593,401 522,763
Hürriyet 558,185 558,185 653,500 519,558 487,714 460,747
Sabah 551,125 551,125 549,910 435,086 434,406 366,769
Habertürk n/a n/a n/a n/a 195,610 286,747
Milliyet 240,366 240,366 241,307 257,035 230,521 255,510
Total 3,019,603 2,590,986 2,703,246 2,600,922 2,709,703 2,671,454
Note: Data from the annual newspaper circulation ﬁ gures provided by Dördüncü Kuvvet Medya.
Source: Dördüncü Kuvvet Medya (Media as Fourth Estate), 2010.
21. MedyaRadar, “Türkiye’de Gazete, Televizyon, Radyo ve Dergi Sayısı Ne Kadar?” (Revealing the Number of Television Channels, Magazines, News-
papers and Radio Stations in Turkey), 2 October 2008, at http://www.medyaradar.com/haber/gundem-21476/turkiyedeki--gazete--televizyon-
-radyo-ve-dergi-sayisi-ne-kadar--peki-kac-iletisim-fakultesi-var--iste-cok-ilginc-rakamlar.html (accessed 12 November 2010).
22. Turkish Journalists’ Association, “April 2009 Report,” at http://www.tgc.org.tr/rapor.asp?rid=73 (accessed 6 April 2011).
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However, the press sector suﬀ ers from a lack of in-depth news coverage and analysis. Th is leads to opinion 
journalism where columnists are given more credit than correspondents. Every newspaper on a daily basis 
uses roughly a dozen columnists writing on a large range of subjects ranging from foreign policy to economy 
who only occasionally provide inside information that correspondents cannot oﬀ er.
Istanbul, which is the most densely populated city of the country, accounts for 45 percent of daily newspaper 
circulation. People living outside Istanbul do, however, have access to all mainstream newspapers, including 
Hürriyet, Milliyet, Sabah, Habertürk, Zaman, and Vatan. (See Table 7.)
Table 7. 
Annual circulation of newspapers and magazines by region of publishing, 2005–2009 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Local 252,884,222 267,910,951 326,759,547 363,258,695 326,925,950
Regional 38,931,906 57,701,132 75,892,636 39,782,116 51,737,336
National 1,238,459,412 1,915,238,942 1,938,925,772 2,147,085,098 1,761,318,691
Total 1,530,275,540 2,240,851,025 2,341,577,955 2,550,125,909 2,139,981,977
Note: News magazine circulation ﬁ gures are not available.
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, Turkey Statistical Yearbook (Türkiye Istatistik Yilliği), Istanbul, 2010.
Stability in the print market has been partly assured by the increasing sales of Zaman over the last ﬁ ve years 
(approximately 60 percent growth over 2005–2009), to reach some 800,000 copies), oﬀ setting declines in 
the readership of the top two most popular titles, Posta and Hürriyet, which both lost almost 10 percent of 
their loyal readership in a ﬁ ve-year period. But the most signiﬁ cant stabilizing factor has been the emergence 
of Habertürk in 2009, which became one of the highest-selling newspapers in the country in less than a year.
News magazine readership remains low, considering the size of the population of the country. Aksiyon is 
one of the primary news magazines with weekly sales of around 38,000, owned by the Feza Group. Th is 
magazine is Islamist in ideology. Other popular news and economic magazines include Ekonomist, selling 
approximately 9,000 copies a week, Para, and Newsweek Türkiye (5,000), which closed in January 2011 due 
to low circulation.
1.3.1.2 News Websites
Th e most popular online news providers are the Turkish versions of Msn.com: Mynet.com and Ekolay.net 
(see Table 8). Th ey oﬀ er news as well as entertainment, such as competitions among their visitors, interesting 
videos, and chat rooms. Established print media have also adapted successfully to the online market. Web 
versions of daily newspapers, Hurriyet.com.tr (Hürriyet), and Milliyet.com.tr (Milliyet) are also quite popular 
among internet users seeking news, each drawing approximately 3 million unique visitors in a month. Th ere 
are also alternative and popular news platforms like Donanimhaber.com, providing up-to -date content 
about technology news and drawing approximately 2 million unique visitors a month. Other online news 
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portals, including Haber7.com, Haberdar.com, and Turktime.com, emerged as carbon copies of the printed 
press, due to their limited budget for hiring their own journalists and providing up-to-date news about recent 
political aﬀ airs.
All the main national newspapers and TV channels have websites updated throughout the day, some of 
which are available in English, including Today’s Zaman (Todayszaman.com) and Hürriyet Daily News 
(Hurriyetdailynews.com).23 Th ese websites provide news in parallel with their political perspectives, also 
reﬂ ected on broadcasting and radio channels owned by multi-sector groups. News content in English oﬀ ered 
by Today’s Zaman and Hürriyet Daily News is often a translation of news provided on Turkish versions of these 
websites. In both English and Turkish websites, there is a lack of diversity due to the highly concentrated 
structure of the media in Turkey, often inﬂ uenced by the political interests of major media owner groups.24, 25
Table 8.
Th e most visited news websites, January 2010






















Hürriyet.com.tr 7,752 36.4 1,277 416 915 62,79 6.6 8.1
Milliyet.com.tr 7,341 34.5 1,28 191 826 60,255 3.2 8.2
Mynet.com 3,851 18.1 700 64 122 30,86 2.1 8.0
Haberler.com 3,796 17.8 243 13 35 8,489 1.5 2.2
Tumgazeteler.com 3,351 15.7 176 8 19 5,706 1.4 1.7
Ekolay News 3,293 15.5 343 3 23 12,301 0.2 3.7
Haberturk.com 3,251 15.3 447 177 338 20,971 8.4 6.4
Note: MM is million per month.
Source: comScore, 2010.26
1.3.1.3 Radio
Th e number of private radio stations currently broadcasting in Turkey is 1,087, with 100 of them also 
available on cable. Of these 36 are national, 100 are regional, and 951 are local radio stations.27
23. Nine newspapers for minority groups are also published in several languages in Turkey: the weekly bilingual Agos (Armenian and Turkish), 
Jamanak (Armenian), Apoyevmatini and Iho (Greek), Azadiya Welat (Kurdish), the weekly Şalom (Ladino and Turkish), Today’s Zaman and 
Hürriyet Daily News (English), and Türkei Kurier (German).
24. A. Akkor Gül “Monopolization of Media Ownership as a Challenge to the Turkish Television Broadcasting System and the European Union,” 
Ankara Review of European Studies 10(2) (2011), p. 29.
25. H. Çakır, “Geleneksel Gazetecilik Karşısında İnternet Gazeteciliği” (Traditional Journalism vs. Online Journalism ), Sosyal Bilimer Enstitüsü Dergisi 
(Social Sciences Institute Journal) 22(1) (2007), p. 143.
26. comScore is an internet marketing research company measuring online audience. See http://www.comscore.com (accessed 11 March 2011).
27. Kurban, D. & Sözeri, C. (2010). Mediam Report, Turkey, at http://www.mediadem.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Turkey.pdf 
(accessed 6 April 2011).
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Th ere are several radio stations that carry news, such as TRT, Habertürk, Fox, CNN Türk, and NTV Radyo, 
each broadcasting news in parallel with the content they provide on television channels. Another radio 
station to mention is Açık Radyo, which oﬀ ers on a daily basis news programs with public discussions on 
sensitive issues such as environmental concerns (e.g. the construction and operation of nuclear power plants 
in Turkey) and media hate speech against women. Açık Radyo diﬀ erentiates itself from other radio stations 
for being ﬁ nancially supported by its listeners.
According to a 2010 survey by RTÜK, 60 percent of the population still listens to radio stations on a regular 
basis.28 Th e radio stations with the greatest listenership in Turkey are mainly music-oriented stations playing 
popular songs in Turkish. Kral FM, owned by DMG, has a strong market position and has been able to 
maintain its audience since its establishment in 2005. Having content similar to that oﬀ ered by Kral FM, 
radio stations such as Power Türk, Süper FM,29 Alem FM, and Radyo D also play 24-hour Turkish popular 
music. (See Table 9.)
Table 9.
Listenership of the most popular radio stations, 2010











Source: RTÜK, Radyo Dinleme Eğilimleri Araştırması II (Radio Listenership Tendencies Report II), Ankara, 2010.
TRT is still one of the most popular radio stations, with its content heavily based on news and news-related 
discussion programs.30 According to RTÜK statistics in 2010, TRT FM is the most popular radio station 
for news, with programs such as “Haberler” (News), “Ekonomi Günlüğü” (Diary of Economics), “Gün Ötesi” 
28. Haber 7, “RTÜK’ten en fazla dinlenen radyolar anketi” (RTÜK reveals the radio stations with the most listenership), 10 February 2010, at 
http://www.haber7.com/haber/20100210/RTUKun-en-fazla-dinlenen-radyolar-anketi.php (accessed 2 November 2011) (hereafter Haber 7, 
“RTÜK’ten en fazla dinlenen radyolar anketi”).
29. Th e Canadian media group Canwest bought four major radio stations (Süper FM, Metro FM, Joy FM, and Joy Türk) in 2007. However, two 
years later Canwest decided to withdraw from the Turkish market and sold all four stations to Spectrum Media Group. It stated that its reasons 
for withdrawal were the legal constraints on foreign ownership in Turkey and changes in its priorities as the result of the global ﬁ nancial crisis.
30. Haber 7, “RTÜK’ten en fazla dinlenen radyolar anketi.”
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(Beyond the Day), and “Gündem” (Agenda). Among TRT’s other radio stations are Radyo 3 (pop-jazz), TRT 
Nağme (folk music), and TRT Türkü (folk).31
According to a nationwide study by İpsos KMG in 2010,32 over 70 percent of listeners have conﬁ dence in 
radio news sometimes, most of the time, or always. (See Figure 4.)
Figure 4.
















Source: İpsos KMG, “Guide to Understanding Turkey: Life Styles and Trends,” research coordinated by Prof. Halil Nalçaoğlu 
with nationwide sample data collected by Ipsos KMG, Istanbul, 2010.
Figure 5.
Radio listenership, 2010
Never (27.9%)Every day (24.7%)
Rarely (12.2%)Several times in a week (19.2%)
Once in a month (4.8%)
Once in a day (5.1%)
Once in a week (6.1%)
Source: İpsos KMG, “Guide to Understanding Turkey: Life Styles and Trends,” research coordinated by Prof. Halil Nalçaoğlu 
with nationwide sample data collected by Ipsos KMG, Istanbul, 2010.
31. RTÜK, Radyo Dinleme Eğilimleri Araştırması II (Radio Listenership Tendencies Report II), Ankara, Turkey, 2010.
32. “Guide to Understanding Turkey: Life Styles and Trends,” 2010, research coordinated by Prof. Halil Nalçaoğlu with nationwide sample data 
collected by Ipsos KMG.
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1.3.1.4 Television
For most Turks, television is the main source of news. Th e most popular news programs are commercial, with 
TRT lagging far behind. News programs oﬀ ered by private television channels such as Kanal D, Fox TV, 
Star, Show TV, and ATV remain at the top of the ratings list on a daily basis. Th e main reason for this is the 
employment of respected anchors for evening news programs such as Ali Kırca, Uğur Dündar, and Mehmet 
Ali Birand. (See Table 10.)
Th e development of multi-channel television has led to a proliferation of news providers. Th e major rolling 
news channels include Habertürk, CNN Türk (a joint venture with CNN International), NTV, Channel 
24, and Sky Türk. Th ere are also television channels such as BBC World, CNN, and TV5 that are available 
to audiences using cable. Roj TV, a pro-PKK channel that broadcasts from abroad by satellite, is also quite 
popular among areas with dense Kurdish populations.33 Th e numerical growth of television providers has 
outstripped their news content diversity.
Commercial television channels have dominated the television market in Turkey since Star TV, the ﬁ rst of 
its kind, was launched in 1989. Kanal D (DMG), ATV (Çalık Holding), Star TV (DMG), and Show TV 
(Çukurova Holding) are currently the main rivals in the ratings battle, while 24-hour news channels and 
TRT lag way behind. 
Table 10.
Viewership of television channels, May 2010
Channel Total (%) Primetime (%)
Kanal D 15.4 22.5
ATV 11.8 15.2
Star TV 8.7 9.0
Show TV 8.5 9.1
Fox TV 7.7 7.0
Samanyolu TV 4.4 4.5
Kanal 7 4.1 3.8
Habertürk 1.7 1.1
Source: AGB Nielsen, Television Audience Measurement Report, Istanbul, 2010.
Fox TV is the main rival of established television channels like Kanal D, ATV, Star TV, and Show TV. It was 
renamed after Huzur TV Radyo AŞ, an incorporated business of İhlas Holding, and sold the brand name and 
broadcast rights of Turkish Newspaper Radio Television (Türkiye Gazetesi Radyo Televizyonu, TGRT) to Fox 
33. Th e PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) is a Marxist-Leninist terrorist organization and an ethnic Kurdish political 
faction, founded by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978. By September 2008, according to the Turkish military, the PKK had caused the deaths of more 
than 12,000 Turkish security oﬃ  cials, soldiers, and civilians.
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News Corporation. Th e pro-Islamic content of TGRT was replaced with a brand new compilation of local 
TV series, news, and sports programs drawing loyal audiences.
Habertürk, a 24-hour news channel, is a newly emerging actor, owned by Ciner Group since its entrance into 
the market in June 2007. Habertürk started broadcasting in October 2008, and surpassed the audience share 
of other news channels such as NTV and CNN Türk in a short period of time. Habertürk emerged as the 
eighth television channel with the most viewers across the country in 2010 (see Table 10). 
1.3.2 Television News Programs
Th e most popular TV news programs in Turkey are the bulletins of Kanal D, ATV, Star Show TV, and Fox 
TV (see Table 11). Th e average duration of daily evening bulletins is 45–50 minutes.
Table 11. 
Th e most popular TV news programs, by audience share (%), April 2010
TV news program Audience share (%)
“M. Ali Birand’la Kanal D Ana Haber” (KanalD) 22.9
“ATV Ana Haber Bülteni” (ATV) 15.1
“Ug˘ur Dündar’la Star Haber” (Star TV) 9.5
“Nazlı Tolga ile Fox Ana Haber” (Fox TV) 7.8
“Ali Kırca ile Ana Haber” (Show TV) 7.4
“Samanyolu Ana Haber Bülteni” (STV) 4.1
“Kanal 7 Ana Haber Bülteni” (Kanal 7) 1.5
Source: Medyaline Rating Measurements, 2010, at http://www.medyaline.com/haberler.asp?katID=3 (accessed 2 February 2011).
TRT oﬀ ers a wide range of news and discussion programs, such as “Dünyamız Detay,” (World in Detail), 
“45 Dakika” (45 Minutes), “Gazeteci Gözüyle” (Journalist’s Eye View), and “Ekonomi Ajandası” (Economy 
Agenda). Reliable recent audience ratings of TRT programs are unavailable due to a dispute between AGB 
Nielsen Research and the corporation (see sections 2.1.1 and 2.2.1).
Samanyolu and Kanal 7, both Islam-oriented channels, also have large audiences for their evening news 
bulletins, and Roj TV reportedly has a signiﬁ cant share among Kurds in south-eastern Anatolia.34
Migration to digital and the availability of digital platforms as oﬃ  cial websites of television channels and 
daily newspapers, oﬀ ering live and recorded broadcasts of news programs, has not aﬀ ected the audience share 
34. Roj TV website, at http://www.roj.tv (accessed 2 August 2011).
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of mainstream television channels. Th e conventional platform is still the most popular medium in Turkey, 
with an average of 5.5 hours’ viewership per person a day.35 
1.3.3 Impact of Digital Media on Good-quality News 
Digitization has had a substantial inﬂ uence in the context of an expanding online news sector. Th e print and 
broadcast news media have also adapted to the online world by maintaining websites. In terms of oﬀ ering 
good-quality news, however, there has been little impact, as most supposedly news-oriented websites do little 
more than copy and paste content from news agencies and the mainstream print media (see section 4.1.1). 
Digital broadcasting is also at an early stage of development (see section 5.2.3).
In terms of comparing the popularity of the websites of public service and private new media, TRT ranks 
lower than the oﬃ  cial news sites of daily newspapers such as Milliyet, Habertürk, Sabah, and Vatan, as well 
as “pure play” online news sites such as Ekolay.net, Mynet.com, Internethaber.com, and Ensonhaber.com, 
according to a survey by the online statistics provider Alexa.com.36
All the national newspapers and television channels have online editions updated throughout the day, and 
there is a small number of web-only news outlets that employ their own journalists, such as Bianet and T24, 
oﬀ ering content on diverse categories such as culture, education, freedom of expression, gender, health, 
women, and youth (see section 4.3.3).37
1.4 Assessments 
Th e main impact of digitization in Turkey has been through the ever-increasing role of websites in news 
provision, both those of mainstream print and broadcast news media and independent web portals. Also 
web radio broadcasting and Turkish news portals speciﬁ cally designed for tablets, such as Zete.com, can be 
considered as the ﬁ rst steps by brand new digital platforms for news distribution. 
Digitization in broadcasting remains a new phenomenon: only 1.6 percent of the population had started to 
use digital platforms for television by the end of 2009.38
Although TRT’s digital technologies meet global standards and TRT has acknowledged cultural diversity in 
Turkey, it is far from competing with the news quality of private radio stations and television channels. TRT’s 
poor performance on news coverage mostly stems from its close links with the ruling party.
35. A. Tunc, “Turkey”, in KAS Democracy Report: Media and Democracy, Vol. II, Konrad Adenauer Shiftung, e.V., Berlin, 2008.
36. See http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/TR (accessed 14 April 2011).
37. See http://www.t24.com.tr/ (accessed 2 March 2011).
38. RTÜK, “Television Viewing Tendencies.”
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2. Digital Media and Public or 
 State-Administered Broadcasters
2.1 Public Service and State Institutions
2.1.1 Overview of Public Service Media; News and Current Affairs Output
Turkey’s public service broadcaster is TRT. It had a monopoly until 1990 but its audience share plummeted 
as soon as it faced competition. According to AGB Nielsen, whose contractor in Turkey is the Television 
Audience Research Board (Televizyon İzleme Araştırma Komitesi, TİAK), its most popular TV channel, TRT 
1, had a daily audience share of just 3 percent in 2010.39
TRT has 10 domestic and three international TV channels, and broadcasts in 35 languages, including 
Kurdish and Armenian. TRT 1 is a family and entertainment channel; TRT Haber (until 2010 TRT 2) 
carries news, sports reports, and weather forecasts during the day and serious documentaries, arts programs, 
and international cinema in the evenings; TRT 3 broadcasts sports events and parliamentary sessions; TRT 
Çocuk is a children’s channel which shares the airwaves with the educational channel TRT 4; and TRT 5 
Anadolu broadcasts regional programs. TRT GAP exists to support a major regional development scheme, 
the South-Eastern Anatolia Project; and TRT 6, launched in January 2009, is a 24-hour Kurdish-language 
service. Th e other domestic channels are TRT Müzik (24-hour music), TRT Belgesel (24-hour multilingual 
tourist-oriented documentaries), and TRT HD (high-deﬁ nition). 
TRT’s international TV channels are the Turkish-language TRT Türk (until 2009 TRT Int. aimed at Turkish 
speakers in Europe), the multilingual TRT Avaz (for Turkic audiences in Europe and Asia), and the Arabic-
language TRT al Turkiye.
39. Television Audience Research Board (Televizyon İzleme Araştırma Komitesi, TİAK), Audience Data Source: Eurodata TV Worldwide, Istanbul, 
Turkey, 2011.
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TRT started radio broadcasting in 1965, and currently owns 14 radio stations. After the AKP came to power, 
TRT was alleged to have entered into a close relationship with the government,40 which led to parliamentary 
inquiries by opposition parties, as well as criticism from journalists, pointing out the changes in program 
content and oﬃ  cial appointments to the channel board. In 2011, proposed changes to the structure of the 
institution had the eﬀ ect of pressuring personnel above the age of 45 into retirement.41 Th ere are concerns 
that this new decree may increase nepotism in TRT, opening its doors to government supporters and people 
close to Islamist networks rather than to highly qualiﬁ ed skilled journalists and trained technical staﬀ . It 
may also damage the long-standing tradition of coaching and mentoring staﬀ . All this is likely to aﬀ ect TRT 
program content.
TRT operates one of the largest news and information networks, locally and internationally, with 14 television 
channels, including TRT 1, TRT News, TRT Music, TRT HD, TRT Avaz, and TRT Şeş.42 TRT’s website 
also oﬀ ers an interactive platform to audiences with opportunities of viewing and listening to all programs 
live and commenting on shows, which commercial channels can rarely oﬀ er. (See Table 12.)
Table 12.
List of TRT radio stations
Radio stations Content
TRT Radyo 1 News, education, culture
TRT FM (2) Popular music
Radyo 3 Classical/jazz music
Radyo 4 Folk music
TRT Türkü Turkish classical & folk music
Türkiye’nin Sesi Radyosu (Voice of Turkey) Turkish classical music
TRT Haber Radyo (TRT News Radio) News
TRT Nag˘me News, folk music
TRT Avrupa FM News, sports, education, popular music
TRT Gap Diyarbakır Radyosu (regional) News, folk music
TRT Trabzon Radyosu (regional) News, folk music
TRT Erzurum Radyosu (regional) News, folk music
TRT Antalya Radyosu (regional) News, folk music
TRT Çukurova Radyosu (regional) News, folk music
Source: TRT website at http://www.trt.net.tr/anasayfa/anasayfa.aspx (accessed 12 November 2011).
40. Milliyet Daily, “TRT Borazan Değil, Vuvuzela Oldu!” (TRT: Th e Vuvuzela of the Government!), 8 July 2011, at http://www.milliyet.com.tr/
trt-borazan-degil-vuvuzela-oldu-/siyaset/sondakika/08.07.2010/1261003/default.htm (accessed 29 February 2012). 
41. Kanun Hükmünde Kararname (Statutory Decree), no. 661 item 24; Art. 13 as Amendment.
42. Interview with Can Soysal, TRT producer, 4 January 2011.
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2.1.2 Digitization and Services
Digitization has enabled the state media to carry its news services on digital platforms. TRT launched its 
website, Trt.net.tr, in May 1999. It includes services such as breaking news from Turkey and the world, 
latest economic developments, sports news, the weather forecast, the radio and television schedule, and 
promotions. Live radio and television programs are available on the internet to enable global users to have 
access to TRT services. Th e channel successfully adapted its oﬄ  ine content to the internet with services such 
as online audiovisual streaming, podcasts of oﬄ  ine radio broadcasts, mobile applications, and RSS feeds in 
order to share up-to-date news. Th e TRT website has also been designed in various languages. Th e news and 
entertainment radio station, the Voice of Turkey, started broadcasting in 26 languages in 2011.
 
2.1.3 Government Support
State subsidies have been guaranteed for TRT through income received by the Turkish Electricity Distribution 
Authority (Turkiye Elektrik Dagitim AŞ, TEDAŞ) (see section 6.2.1). State support is not, however, necessarily 
related to digitization. Rather, it is to ensure the sustainability of public service media in Turkey. On the 
other hand, the digital switch-over has been carried out jointly with private broadcasters, with the expected 
establishment of a transmitter company called Anten AŞ, which was to be shared in the following proportions: 
70 percent for national private broadcasters, 20 percent for TRT, and 10 percent for regional and local 
channels.43 Th us, the state does not play a ﬁ nancial role in actualizing the digitization process.44
2.1.4 Public Service Media and Digital Switch-over
Th e process of digitizing terrestrial platforms has helped public media to increase their inﬂ uence over the 
Turkish audience. Although TRT has lost its former monopolistic power and respectability in terms of 
oﬀ ering reliable news content, TRT oﬃ  cials explain that the channel plays a key role in the government’s 
digital switch-over plans. Th is could potentially result in a more eﬃ  cient engagement with their audience. 
However, the channel representatives have not provided any information on anticipated digital services, 
which epitomizes the organization’s lack of transparency. 
Despite falling behind commercial channels in popularity, TRT still has a privileged position in terms of 
accessing new technologies with government support. According to Can Soysal, a long-serving TRT producer: 
 
Digital broadcasting has not started to work eﬃ  ciently in Turkey. TRT has been the forerunner 
of terrestrial broadcasting in the country, and thanks to this, its audience will soon have 
the chance to buy digital bundles. Due not only to digitization, but also to the increase 
in commercial broadcasting and thematic television channels, the popularity of public 
broadcasting has been aﬀ ected both in Turkey and all around the world. However, TRT is 
43. Anten AŞ is still expected to be established by the end of 2014, which RTÜK says is the year in which the completion of the digital switch-over 
process is anticipated. 
44. Interview conducted by Babacan Taşdemir with Taha Yücel, board member of RTÜK.
3 1O P E N  S O C I E T Y  M E D I A  P R O G R A M     2 0 1 2
adapting by launching new thematic television channels and renewed content, including 
new television series and reality shows, similar to the content provided by commercial 
broadcasters.45 
2.2 Public Service Provision
2.2.1 Perception of Public Service Media
Public perception of TRT has been shaped by its history and its structural closeness to the government. 
Although TRT was established as an autonomous corporation in 1964, it functioned as a propaganda outlet. 
Moreover, it enjoyed a monopoly in television broadcasting until the early 1990s. Nevertheless, its programs 
were criticized several times by government oﬃ  cials for broadcasts about youth protests and daily life in 
Anatolia, which were seen as harmful to the preservation of national harmony and unity. Its autonomy was 
also undermined by accusations of pro-leftist bias. As a result, the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) amended the 
law on the regulation of TRT in 1969, making it easier for government oﬃ  cials to inﬂ uence its content.
TRT’s autonomy has also been explicitly undermined by the government’s inﬂ uence over appointments to 
the board of directors. According to Law no. 6112 on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises 
and their Media Services, board membership reﬂ ects the political parties’ presence in the cabinet. Th is ensures 
that the most powerful political parties dominate the board’s deliberations.
Despite the public perception of its pro-government news content and making state propaganda, TRT still 
ranks as the most reliable news source for the citizens of Turkey in general.46 But perceptions are polarized 
according to political partisanship. Supporters of the AKP approved TRT as the most authentic news source, 
while supporters of the opposition Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and Nationalist 
Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) favored Star TV.47
However, TRT has lost ground to competing television channels over the past two decades. According to 
2008 Television Audience Shares statistics, TRT was far behind private television channels such as Kanal D, 
Show TV, ATV, and Star TV. TRT withdrew from the rating measurements of AGB Nielsen Media Research 
in 2010, with the claim that the results provided by the research company do not reﬂ ect the growing audience 
reach of the broadcaster.48 (See Figure 6.)
45. Interview with Can Soysal, TRT producer, 4 January 2011.
46. Dördüncü Kuvvet Medya, “Medyaya Duyulan Güven Araştırmasından Çarpıcı Sonuçlar,” 19 February 2010, at http://www.dorduncukuvvetm-
edya.com/1412-medyaya-duyulan-guven-arastirmasi-ndan-cikan-carpici-sonuclar.html (accessed November 2011) (hereafter Dördüncü Kuvvet 
Medya, “Medyaya Duyulan Güven Araştırmasından Çarpıcı Sonuçlar”).
47. Dördüncü Kuvvet Medya, “Medyaya Duyulan Güven Çarpıcı Sonuçlar.”
48. See http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25043679 (accessed 12 February 2011).
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Figure 6.
TV audience shares: all day and all viewers (%), 2008
                                           









Source: AGB Nielsen Media Research, TV Audience Shares Report, Istanbul, 2008.
Haluk Şahin, a professor of the School of Communication at Istanbul Bilgi University, says that the public 
perception of TRT is biased:
TRT is heavily slanted in favor of the party in power and their supporters. No news critical 
of the government is likely to make it into the news broadcasts. Th ese broadcasts reﬂ ect the 
new ideological status quo, i.e., present a mixture of religion-tinted conservatism, superﬁ cial 
liberalism, and a pragmatic pro-governmental line.49
On TRT morning shows where daily newspapers are reviewed, only pro-government newspapers are 
highlighted, whereas critical headlines and editorials of the oppositional press are always excluded. Th is 
general bias in news coverage creates skepticism among the public, which has resulted in non-payment of 
license fees.
2.2.2 Public Service Provision in Commercial Media
No speciﬁ c obligations are imposed on commercially funded media to produce public service content. 
(Spectrum allocation policy is discussed in section 5.1.1.) Th e regulations on public service provision in 
commercial media are not covered by RTÜK’s code on licensing transactions and applications for radio and 
television. In order to acquire a license for a television or radio station, the applicant has to demonstrate 
its ﬁ nancial capacity to RTÜK in respect of its proposed oﬀ ering to the audience. RTÜK also requires 
the technical and administrative requirements to be guaranteed, which would be enough for the applicant 
company to receive a temporary license for broadcasting.50 RTÜK has not provided a permanent license to 
any applicant company since 1995, and temporary licenses cover a ﬁ ve-year time period. 
49. Interview with Professor Haluk Şahin at İstanbul Bilgi University, 24 December 2010.
50. RTÜK’s code on Licensing Transactions and Applications for Radio and Television, at http://www.rtuk.org.tr/sayfalar/IcerikGoster.aspx?icerik_
id=17e4a071-abaa-4579-80ea-ab53c88fd3b3 (accessed 14 April 2011).
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2.3 Assessments 
Digital media have given TRT the opportunity to oﬀ er its content across multiple platforms including 
television and radio streaming via its oﬃ  cial website. Despite this obvious advantage, with commercialization, 
public service broadcasting has lost the upper hand in the competitive Turkish broadcasting market. TRT 
has functioned as the voice of the government for decades. Th e parties in power have consistently used the 
public broadcasting services for propaganda purposes, despite TRT’s independence being enshrined under 
the protection of the constitution (Art. 133). Th e major weakness of TRT as an institution is party nepotism 
with its overstaﬀ ed structure. Th e content of many programs, including children’s cartoons or educational 
shows, are conservative and religious in content, which can be regarded as a problematic development in 
terms of the philosophy of public service broadcasting.
As discussed, there have been some positive developments in recent years in terms of TRT’s audience reach, 
particularly in its multilingual content. For instance, programming in Kurdish has triggered a series of political 
debates and has been perceived by the EU as a positive step towards the democratization of the country.51 
However, the institution currently lacks credibility and reliability, and state provisions remain scant. Given 
the social and political circumstances of Turkey, the objectivity of public broadcasting is essential to fulﬁ ll and 
reﬂ ect the democratic, cultural, and social needs of the country.
51. Turkey 2009 Progress Report: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges, accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and Council, Brussels.
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3. Digital Media and Society
3.1 User-Generated Content (UGC)
3.1.1 UGC Overview
Th e internet has become part of most people’s lives in Turkey. According to the Minister of Transport and 
Communications, Binali Yıldırım, the number of internet users exceeded 35 million in 2010.52 Social media 
are widely popular, with 16 million Facebook and approximately 5.6 million MSN visitors on a monthly 
basis. (See Table 13.)
Websites dedicated to social networking and entertainment purposes are more popular than news sites and 
blogs. Facebook is currently the most visited website, with the highest number of unique visitors. It is followed 
by Live.com, second, and Msn.com, third, which oﬀ er a collection of services such as chat and email, as well 
as websites with news and entertainment content. 
Among the websites with the highest number of unique visitors, only two out of 20 can be classiﬁ ed as news 
portals launched by print media organizations. Th ese are Hürriyet (owned by DMG) and Milliyet (formerly 
also owned by DMG, but sold to DK Publishing House in April 2011). Online platforms of both Hürriyet 
and Milliyet employ several UGC services with their free membership oﬀ ers and user comment options. 
Registered users of Hürriyet and Milliyet have the option to store their favorite news stories in their accounts 
as well. Milliyet also oﬀ ers blogging services for its users, in which bloggers are given the opportunity to share 
their opinions and commentaries on up-to-date news in detail. 
Blogging sites (Blogspot.com, Blogcu.com) and -mail services (Yahoo.com, Msn.com, Mynet.com), as well 
as video-sharing platforms (Vidivodo.com, Izlesene.com, Facebookvideoindir.gen.tr), online marketplaces 
(Sahibinden.com, Gittigidiyor.com), and online gaming sites (Oyunlar1.com, Mynet.com, Ekolay.net) are 
also among the most visited websites in Turkey. 
52. Internet World Stats, Turkey Internet Usage and Telecommunications Report, available at: http://www.internetworldstats.com/eu/tr.htm 
(accessed 13 September 2011).
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Table 13.
Th e most used websites by monthly unique visitors, December 2010





















Source: Google Doubleclick Ad Planner, December 2010
Political news blogging is neither developed nor inﬂ uential in Turkey, partly because of the wide variety of 
opinion available via newspaper and magazine websites, and partly because of the unusual role played by a 
collaborative hypertext dictionary site, Ekşi Sözlük (Sour Dictionary, sozluk.sourtimes.org ),53 and various 
imitators. Ekşi Sözlük, launched in February 1999, is a platform on which explanations and deﬁ nitions of 
almost any concept, person or act can be posted and shared anonymously. Along with similar forums—Santral 
Sözlük (www.santralsozluk.com), İnci Sözlük (inci.sozlukspot.com), Uludağ Sözlük (www.uludagsozluk.
com), and ITU Sözlük (www.itusozluk.com)—Ekşi Sözlük has become a major arena for airing sensitive 
social and political subjects, such as conscientious objection, homosexuality, and ethnicity, including the 
Kurdish issue and the internationally recognized Armenian genocide. 
53. Hürriyet Daily News, “EkşiSözlük: A Turkish Internet Phenomenon,” by Arman Turgut, 14 August 2006, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.
php?news=eksi-sozluk-a-turkish-internet-phenomenon-2006-08-14 (accessed 12 December 2010).
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Ekşi Sözlük has been the subject of enormous mainstream media attention and several high-proﬁ le legal 
cases. In 2006, the police objected to entries on marijuana, which they claimed had encouraged young 
readers to experiment with the drug, the upshot of which was that access to these entries was blocked by a 
court decision.54 In 2007, Adnan Oktar, a controversial religious ﬁ gure known for his conspiracy theories 
on Judaism, freemasonry, and the Holocaust, claimed that he had been defamed by Ekşi Sözlük writers and 
applied to the courts to block access to the site.55 Th ere was a short ban on the entries on “Adnan Oktar” and 
“Adnan Hoca” that was overturned on appeal.56
Ekşi Sözlük moderators have also used the law on their critics, for instance taking out a libel action against 
a TV presenter and columnist, Fatih Altaylı, for insulting Sözlük writers. Altaylı was forced to publish an 
apology.57 In return, Altaylı asked the court to order the removal of all entries insulting him, and consequently 
97 entries were removed from the Ekşi Sözlük website by a court order. Ekşi Sözlük drew approximately 
2,750,000 visitors per month in 2010, and hosted 33,948 writers contributing to its content on a voluntary 
basis. Ekşi Sözlük also has 343,262 registered users visiting the website as “readers.” Th e website requires no 
registration to access its content.
Th ere are also alternative news platforms with original content on minority rights, the economy, and freedom 
of speech, such as Bianet.org, and Medyatava.com, providing up-to-date domestic and global news, and 
interviews with government oﬃ  cials, writers, columnists, and celebrities. Th ese platforms appeal to a limited 
audience and they remain outside the 100 most visited websites.58 
3.1.2 Social Networks
Social networking and entertainment media sites account for a large and rapidly growing share of Turkish 
online activity.59 Social networking among internet users accounted for 9 percent of total time spent online 
in March 2009 and 15 percent in September 2009. 
Th e growth of social networking and entertainment media sites has not been without its diﬃ  culties. In 2008, 
YouTube was blocked by the government after a court in Ankara ruled that various videos posted on the site 
were “insulting and humiliating to the legacy of Turkey’s founding father, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.”60
54. Milliyet Daily, “Ekşi Sözlük’e Erişim Engeli” (Ekşi Sözlük Banned), 23 May 2006, at http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/05/23/son/sontur27.asp 
(accessed 12 December 2010).
55. Milliyet Daily, “Ekşi Sözlük Kapanacak!” (Ekşi Sözlük is Going to Be Banned!), 17 April 2007, at http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/04/17/son/
sontur39.asp (accessed 13 December 2010).
56. See http://www.eksisozluk.com (accessed 12 December 2010).
57. MediaCat Online, “Sosyal Medyaya Karşı bir Fatih Altaylı” (Fatih Altaylı Against Social Media), 1 September 2010, at http://www.mediacaton-
line.com/Home/YazarDetay?haberid=49202 (accessed 12 December 2010).
58. Google AdPlanner Statistics, at http://www.google.com/adplanner/static/top100countries/tr.html
59. Turkey: 32 hours (average hours spent by a visitor per month) 3,044 pages (average pages viewed by a visitor per month), information at http://
www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2009/5/Turkey_has_Seventh_Largest_Online_Audience_in_Europe (accessed 13 December 
2011).
60. “Youtube ve Atatürk’e Hakaret” (Youtube and Insult to Atatürk), 12 March 2007, available at http://www2.bianet.org/bianet/bianet/93199-
youtube-ve-ataturke-hakaret (accessed 14 January 2011).
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Th e government demanded that the online giant register in Turkey, operate under Turkish law, and pay taxes 
in Turkey. Th e Ministry of Finance sought taxes of € 15.1 million, and YouTube refused to pay. As a result, 
between May 2008 and November 2010, YouTube was inaccessible in Turkey. According to the Minister of 
Transport and Communications, Binali Yıldırım, the ban was lifted as the oﬀ ending videos were removed 
from the site. YouTube claimed that it had nothing to do with the removal of the oﬀ ending videos. As a result 
of the blocking of YouTube, three separate applications were made to the European Court of Human Rights 
from Turkey alleging an infringement of Art. 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
  
3.1.3 News in Social Media
Social networks are important as a means of directing users to news websites and online magazines. Some 4 
percent of the newspaper Milliyet’s online news visitors come via Facebook, for example.61
Many journalists use Twitter to publicize their work and to engage in debate and banter. Twitter has also been 
discovered by politicians. Th e president, Abdullah Gül, and the leader of the main opposition party both 
tweet regularly as part of their PR.
3.2 Digital Activism
3.2.1 Digital Platforms and Civil Society Activism
Th e digital platforms are eﬀ ectively used for civil activism, despite the sometimes seemingly arbitrary 
implementations of established legal regulations in Turkey. For instance, the two-year YouTube ban in 2008–
2010 (see section 3.1.2) prompted various activists and academics to create exceptionally inﬂ uential protest 
blogs such as the Internet without Censorship Movement (Sansürsüz İnternet, www.sansursuzinternet.org.
tr), the Cyber Rights Movement (www.cyber-rights.org.tr), and the Censoring Censorship Movement (www.
sansuresansur.org).  
Facebook has also been widely used to organize social and political protests. A few of the most noteworthy 
groups succeeded in mobilizing thousands of people on the ﬁ rst anniversary of the murder of Hrant Dink, 
a prominent Turkish-Armenian journalist and editor-in-chief of the newspaper Agos, who was gunned down 
in broad daylight in front of his oﬃ  ce on 19 January 2007.62 His murder triggered protests against ultra-
nationalists, and every year since on the anniversary of his death there have been demonstrations in Ankara 
and Istanbul to honor Mr Dink and demand justice. Th ese groups are primarily mobilized through events 
created on Facebook.
61. Google AdPlanner Statistics, at http://www.google.com/adplanner/static/top100countries/tr.html
62. “4 Yıldır Yüzleri Yok, Yürekleri yok” (For Four Years, Th ey Don’t Have Faces, Th ey Don’t Have Hearts), at http://www.facebook.com/event.
php?eid=117856624952024; “Hrant Dink İçin Hepimiz: Alışmadan Utanmadan” (Together for Hrant Dink: Not Tamed Not Ashamed), at 
http://www.facebook.com/event.php?eid=157125291004775 (accessed 15 January 2011).
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Armenian genocide
Another taboo that has been broken online is the ofﬁ cial denial of the Armenian genocide of 1915–
1918. Hundreds of thousands of Armenians died in 1915, in what Armenians say was a systematic 
massacre at the hands of the Ottoman Turks. More than a dozen countries, various international 
bodies, and many Western historians have recognized it as genocide. Turkey denies any genocide 
being practiced, saying the deaths were a part of the First World War. Turkey and neighboring 
Armenia still have no ofﬁ cial relations. 
In 2008, a group of 200 Turkish intellectuals signed an online petition to launch a campaign 
apologizing to Armenians for their suffering at the hands of Ottoman forces during the First World 
War.63  The online petition campaign was covered by mainstream media, and was discussed on several 
panel shows of television news. This triggered a heated debate among the public. While reporting, all 
mainstream journalists still have to refer to Armenian genocide as “alleged” while writing about it. 
This rhetoric is based on the denial of the genocide’s existence, which is in harmony with the ofﬁ cial 
stance (see section 7.3.1).
Digital platforms have also been important in other political mobilizations, notably the Marches for the 
Republic (Cumhuriyet Mitingleri) organized by anti-AKP citizens, who perceive the political strategies of the 
party as threats to Turkey’s secularist constitution.64
Facebook has also been the media through which protests against the AKP’s anti-alcohol policies have been 
organized.65 In January 2011, a Facebook group with 130,000 members held a series of gatherings in cities 
such as Istanbul, Ankara, Eskişehir, and Adana to protest against the policy, consuming alcohol throughout 
the event.66 On the day of the protest, the group’s page was hacked and its name changed from “Cheers to 
the AKP” to “I will be voting in favor of AKP in the next general election.”67
In September 2010, a gang of 40 or 50 men attacked several art galleries in Istanbul’s Tophane district, 
physically assaulting people attending exhibition openings, among them artists, academics, students, writers, 
local and international journalists, and cultural attachés from diﬀ erent consular missions. Th e attackers used 
knives, sticks, broken bottles, and chilli spray to injure Polish, Dutch, German, and English guests. It turned 
out that the attack followed the complaints of religious residents of the area opposed to consumption of 
63. “We Are Apologizing” Campaign, at http://www.ozurdiliyoruz.com (accessed 18 January 2011).
64. Milliyet Daily, “Sandalye Denkleminde AKP Kazançlı Çıktı” (AKP Gets the Majority of Seats in the Parliament), 24 July 2011, at http://www.
milliyet.com.tr/2007/07/24/siyaset/siy03.html (accessed 2 August 2011).
65. Facebook event “AKP’ye inat içiyorum” (In spite of AKP, I keep drinking) http://www.facebook.com/event.php?eid=155358954516378 
(accessed 17 March 2011).
66. Samanyolu Haber, “AKP’ye İçiyoruz Grubu Şok Oldu!” (Cheers to the AKP Group Got Shocked!) 14 January 2011, at: http://www.saman-
yoluhaber.com/h_493487_facebookta-akpye-iciyoruz-grubuna-toplanan-130-bin-kisi-bir-tikla-ak-partili-oldu.html (accessed 15 March 2011) 
(hereafter Samanyolu Haber, “AKP’ye İçiyoruz Grubu Şok Oldu!”).
67. Samanyolu Haber, “AKP’ye İçiyoruz Grubu Şok Oldu!”
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alcohol at receptions in the galleries. Th e attack appears to have been organized via Islamist groups. It was 
covered in detail by mainstream newspapers, news web portals, as well as art and culture magazines such as 
Bir+Bir.68
3.2.2 The Importance of Digital Mobilizations
Th e inﬂ uence of digital mobilizations is mainly restricted to those people who are digitally connected. 
However, the contribution of new media to journalism practice and the public sphere more broadly is 
quite signiﬁ cant. Given the fact that there is a sustained increase in the number of internet users and social 
media participants, the traditional mainstream media outlets have adapted in order to be more active online, 
especially in order to engage with younger audiences. UGC websites continuously oﬀ er complimentary 
news sources to an increasingly digitally literate audience. Since there is a common distrust of print media 
among the public, digital platforms are used as a refreshing alternative. As noted above, the delicate social 
and political issues such as Armenian genocide, Kurdish nationalism, homosexuality, and conscientious 
objection are discussed more freely on blogs and hypertext dictionary sites such as Ekşi Sözlük than through 
mainstream media outlets.
Kaos GL, one of the primary groups seeking to promote human rights in Turkey, speciﬁ cally the rights of 
homosexuals, was established in Ankara to achieve its aim by publishing a quarterly magazine called Kaos GL 
in 1994. Ali Erol, a founding member, explains that Kaos GL started to operate online with the establishment 
of a website on Yahoo! Geocities in the early 2000s, in order to provide scanned copies of printed Kaos 
GL magazines.69 Since the launch of Kaosgl.org in 2007, the group has managed to encourage writers, 
reporters, and translators nationwide to contribute to their website on a voluntary basis. While Kaos GL 
keeps publishing quarterly printed magazines, the group also operates actively on social media networking 
sites as Facebook70 and Twitter71 to expand its readership.
Another inﬂ uential group utilizing various online platforms such as Facebook and Wordpress is Amargi,72 
which advocates women’s, homosexual, and transgendered rights in Turkey. Th e group got involved in 
organizing press conferences and protests against court decisions made against Pınar Selek, a sociologist and 
a feminist writer charged for a mass-killing attempt in Mısır Çarşısı, İstanbul.73 Amargi became the primary 
advocate of the case by publishing press releases on Wordpress before each court trial, and announcing street 
protests to defend Ms Selek on the Facebook page of the organization.
68. Sale of Bir+Bir magazine was banned by one of the biggest bookstore chains in Turkey, D&R, due to its claims that the magazine mocked the 
Turkish National Anthem, “İstiklal Marşı” (Independence March-National Anthem of Turkey) by publishing a poem called “İstikbal Marşı” 
(Independence March) on its editorial page in February 2011. For more details, see http://bianet.org/bianet/ifade-ozgurlugu/127821-d-r-hassas-
vatandasi-dusunup-bir-birin-satisini-yasakladi (accessed 14 March 2011).
69. Kaos GL, at http://www.kaosgl.com/sayfa.php?id=9177 (accessed 2 November 2011).
70. Facebook page of KaosGL, at http://www.facebook.com/pages/Kaos-GL/113817517723 (accessed 2 November 2011).
71. Twitter proﬁ le of Kaos GL, at http://twitter.com/kaosGL (accessed 2 November 2011).
72. Oﬃ  cial website of Amargi, at http://www.amargi.org.tr (accessed 3 November 2011).
73. Th e lawsuit against Pınar Selek started in 1998, and the case still has not been resolved. 
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Various communities, such as environmentalist and leftist political groups, also actively use social media 
platforms to mobilize their members against discriminatory practices and controversial court decisions. 
Creating Facebook events and groups are the most utilized methods of digital activism by groups such as 
those opposing the establishment of a nuclear power station in Mersin.74 Th e main motivation behind this 
Facebook event was to mobilize individuals against a new nuclear power plant in southern Turkey, after the 
Chernobyl disaster. Th e protests, which started on Facebook, resulted in a permanent campaign by a group 
of environmentalists. Th is group created a grassroots organization called the Anti-Nuclear Platform (Nükleer 
Karşıtı Platform), and its struggle against all the proposed nuclear power plants still continues.
Leftist groups also mobilize on Facebook to gather and discuss the political history and current politics of 
Turkey from a socialist perspective.75 Th e Facebook event created by the Anti-Capitalist Forum (Antikapitalist 
Forum) presents an example of the way members of leftist political communities mobilize. Th e aim was to 
discuss the revolutions in the Middle East and the contemporariness of Marxist ideology, as part of a series 
of regular meetings. Th e Revolutionary Socialist Workers’ Party (Devrimci Sosyalist Isçi Partisi, DSIP) also 
supported the meeting.
Online activism does not usually get full coverage in the mainstream media. Such coverage as these cases do 
receive tends to focus on the consequences of the activities rather than the mobilizing role of social media. 
Th e frequency of such mobilizations is increasing among the young population, since mainstream media 
often look the other way when it comes to controversial and oppositional subjects. 
3.3 Assessments
Th e impact of the new media is still to be fully felt, but so far it would appear to have given citizens new 
opportunities for civic activism and political participation. Certain Web 2.0 platforms, primarily Facebook, 
have already provided people with new opportunities to share their thoughts on political and social topics.
Despite the lack of eﬀ ective political news blogs and the immense popularity of entertainment websites, 
social media networks and Sözlük platforms built up on users’ contributions, have emerged as inﬂ uential 
services for mobilizing and informing political activity. Social media have especially played a major role in 
organizing protests against the ruling AKP and against the murder of Mr Dink, and these actions in turn have 
opened up new spaces for digital activism.
Th e pressure of legal restrictions is a major concern for the future, particularly in the context of internet 
regulation (see section 7). Even so, civil society organizations such as Amargi, Kaos GL, and various 
environmental and leftist groups depend on online communications to mobilize their supporters and 
communicate their messages to national audiences.  
 
74 Facebook group, Çukurova Anti-Nükleer İnsiyatiﬁ  (Çukurova Anti-Nuclear Initiative), at http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=211732
549515 (accessed 3 November 2011).
75. Facebook event, Antikapitalist Forum—Ankara, at http://www.facebook.com/event.php?eid=150617131674453 (accessed 4 November 2011).
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4. Digital Media and Journalism
4.1 Impact on Journalists and Newsrooms
4.1.1 Journalists
While digitization has put pressure on existing journalists to keep up with and share global news, and to use 
social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter for personal and journalistic purposes, the actual practice 
of online journalism has primarily had an impact in terms of sharing up-to-date news at a moment’s notice. 
Zülal Kalkandelen, a journalist at Cumhuriyet and a professional of print and visual media since 1996, has 
been a witness of and participant in the digitization of journalism.76 She points out that the “internet has 
provided enormous opportunities for journalists to reach global news sources in a shorter period of time, 
which enables them to draw comparisons between news content to test their reliability.” 
Egemen Limoncuoğlu, an experienced music critic and journalist, points out that the internet allows 
journalists a wider reach, despite the disadvantages associated with the unreliability of online sources.77 In 
this context, Mr Limoncuoğlu emphasizes the importance of being selective in choosing accredited news 
sources.78 An active user of Twitter, Mr Limoncuoğlu explains: “Social media platforms give the opportunity 
to journalists to engage with readers more easily by sharing the links of the printed contents and receiving 
instant feedback from readers.”
However, as a result of digitization, some journalists began to recycle web content, to reduce costs. Th is 
exacerbated the lack of original investigative journalism practice. Th is is not to claim that digitization is the 
most severe problem that journalists confront in Turkey. Nevertheless, copy-and-paste reporting is one of the 
major shortcomings of digital media, and is common in Turkish online journalism. Far more important is the 
concentration of media ownership, the partisanship of the media, the tendency to recruit star columnists rather 
76. Interview conducted with Cumhuriyet journalist, Zülal Kalkandelen, on 17 September 2011.
77. Interview conducted with Milliyet Sanat journalist/author, Egemen Limoncuoğlu, on 16 September 2011.
78. Interview conducted with Milliyet Sanat journalist/author, Egemen Limoncuoğlu, on 16 September 2011.
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than investing in reporters, the low level of union organization among journalists, and legislation, in particular 
the Criminal Code and the Anti-Terrorism Law, which make it easy for the state to punish online journalists.
Th ere is an ongoing debate whether bloggers and online news editors should be acknowledged as journalists. 
On November 2011, the deputy prime minister, Bülent Arınç, announced that they would be granted yellow 
(permanent) press cards, starting in January 2012. While this concession was seen by many as an attempt 
by the state to control online journalism, others pointed out that a yellow press card is perceived as an 
essential step to granting professional rights for online journalists. Since the General Directorate of Press and 
Information (Oﬃ  ce of the Prime Minister) issues accreditation, this decision can be regarded as an attempt 
to bring online journalists under some kind of state control in the same way as mainstream journalists.79 
Social media platforms, especially Twitter, have become one of the most eﬀ ective tools for journalists since 
2010. Numerous columnists, correspondents, and photo-journalists disseminate news on Twitter in advance 
of the newspapers going to print or television bulletin schedules. In addition to formal news, they have the 
opportunity to add personal comments and criticisms to their tweets. Th is is also a whole new practice for 
reporters. Twitter as a journalistic platform is more democratic, interactive, and open compared with the 
biased and partisan mainstream media. Traditional media outlets often try to compete with the dynamism and 
speed of Twitter in terms of news dissemination and sometimes use the news content from journalists’ tweets. 
4.1.2 Ethics
Digitization also has a major impact on journalism in terms of creating lively discussion platforms around 
sensitive issues. Th is is a new situation creating occasional ethical dilemmas. For instance, the primary ethical 
challenge for journalism in Turkey, as elsewhere, is to provide reliable news and information despite all the 
external pressures that make it diﬃ  cult. Th e internet, however, creates an environment in which speed is 
valued over reliability for journalists. Reporting unchecked and unveriﬁ ed materials as facts and quoting 
anonymous sources have become routine practices of the copy-and-paste journalism of the past decade. 
Although the mainstream news organizations and press associations publish ethical codes,80 few media outlets 
have a proper ombudsman or other self-monitoring mechanisms.
All this often leads to embarrassing failures. One notable example occurred in 2010, after the website 
Zaytung.com,81 a satirical outlet that specializes in spoof news similar to Th eonion.com in the United States,82 
deliberately published a false news item. Th is item stated that the Turkish ambassador to Sierra Leone had 
embarked on lobbying activities to pass a bill on the Armenian genocide, opposing the government’s policy 
on the issue, as he increasingly felt “forgotten” in a far-ﬂ ung country, and wanted to renew his career in 
79. Bianet, “Gazeteci ‘Yeter Artık’ Diyebilir”(Journalists Can Now Say ‘Enough!’), 25 February 2012, at http://bianet.org/biamag/ifade-
ozgurlugu/136438-gazeteci-yeter-artik-diyebilir (accessed 3 March 2012).
80. For example, Hürriyet Editorial Codes of Ethics, at http://www.hurriyetkurumsal.com/tr/degerler_hurriyet_yayin_ilkeleri.asp (accessed 
2 September 2011); Press Council codes of journalistic ethics, at http://www.basinkonseyi.org.tr/lang_tr/pressOccupationPrinciples.asp 
(accessed 3 September 2011).
81. See www.zaytung.com (accessed 11 September 2011).
82. Th e motto of Zaytung.com is “Honest, Unbiased and Immoral News.”
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Turkey again. Banu Avar, a journalist guest on the Kanal B television program “Bekleme Odası” (Waiting 
Room), quoted this story without checking the reliability of the source:
So have you heard about Sierra Leone? I guess I do not remember the last name of the 
ambassador, but he [Orhan Emin Türköne] has been there for 12 years now ... as an oﬃ  cial 
representative of Turkish foreign aﬀ airs going through all the African countries, conducting 
lobbying activities to pass the Armenian draft ... He utilized every opportunity to explain 
how his own grandfather massacred hundreds of Armenians, talking things like these at 
places where he should not have done it.
Th is in turn led to a special statement by Ersin Özbükey, under-secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs, 
who said he was working on removing the ambassador from the oﬃ  ce.83 It subsequently turned out that 
Turkey did not even have an embassy in Sierra Leone.
4.2 Investigative Journalism
4.2.1 Opportunities
Even in its early stages, digitization has certainly made it easier for investigative journalists to alert people 
to their work. At the same time, social media are playing an important role in publicizing the persecution 
of investigative journalists by the authorities, which are notorious for their arbitrary arrests. However, 
investigative journalism is hard to carry out in Turkey because of the lack of freedom of expression due to 
controversial Articles such as no. 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, making it illegal to insult Turkey and its 
national identity. Although Art. 301 was amended in 2008 in order to prevent misuse, the law still poses a 
direct threat to freedom of expression, not only in terms of limiting the conduct of investigative journalists 
via traditional media, but also standing as a restrictive article in digital platforms. 
Digitization has immense potential to reshape the traditional media structure and bypass partisan editorial 
decisions in Turkey. However, it is insuﬃ  ciently used, although many unemployed journalists or internet 
users are exploiting digital platforms for investigative reporting in eﬀ ective ways. Th e speedy dissemination 
of documents or leaked information is one of the most powerful features of digitization. Th is feature has 
been recently used as a tool for digital activism to support an investigative journalist behind bars. Ahmet Şık’s 
unpublished book, İmam’ın Ordusu (Th e Imam’s Army), was leaked on the internet and instantly shared via 
Twitter on 11 April 2011. Mr Şık had been arrested for allegedly aiding Ergenekon, a terrorist organization. 
Th e 12th Court for Serious Crimes in Istanbul characterized the draft book as an “illegal organizational 
document” and also ruled that anyone who refuses to hand in copies of the book would be accused of 
“supporting a criminal organization.” Th us, thousands of people volunteered to be part of a “crime” by 
downloading, reading, and sharing Mr Şık’s unpublished book, which reveals dark relations between the 
Gülen Islamist community and the police and its embedding in the Turkish security forces. 
83. Kanal B, Television program “Waiting Room”, 26 March 2010.
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4.2.2 Threats
Practicing investigative journalism in Turkey has always been risky, due mainly to the restrictive legal 
framework governing journalists’ conduct. From this perspective, digitization has not changed the situation. 
Indeed, it has created some additional concerns. Th e majority of online news platforms visited for this 
research revealed that many websites operate anonymously without providing information about the number 
and even the identity of their investigative journalists or columnists hired. Th e oﬀ er of news platforms also 
lacks authenticity, as anonymous news editors simply copy items from major oﬄ  ine news outlets instead of 
hiring their own journalists. 
Investigative journalists in Turkey are paying a heavy price for their critical coverage of an extremely 
sensitive subject, an alleged clandestine network of secularist military oﬃ  cers and ultra-nationalists known 
as Ergenekon, that is believed to have plotted a coup against the pro-Islamic AKP government. Th e arrest of 
alleged military conspirators in 2007 was initially hailed as a victory for democracy among intellectuals, but 
the conspiracy allegations have since been seen as a pretext for witch hunts to muzzle critical voices. 
Th e Turkish justice system uses exceptional anti-terror measures against journalists who are only doing 
their job. In particular, articles under the anti-terrorist law provide for prison sentences in cases involving 
“propaganda for a terrorist organization,” very often leading to journalists being brought before special courts 
for organized crime. 
4.2.3 New Platforms
New platforms such as blogs remain insigniﬁ cant in terms of contributing to investigative journalism. Although 
blog-hosting platforms are some of the most visited websites in the country, the number of subscribers and 
readers is still relatively low. Th e content oﬀ ered by bloggers is mostly composed of commentaries, as well as 
excerpts from other news sources, although it helps ongoing political aﬀ airs in Turkey to become more visible 
and create a wider impact worldwide.
4.2.4 Dissemination and Impact
Th e impact of digitization on the dissemination of investigative journalism still remains insigniﬁ cant. While 
dissemination has become easier in theory with the rising number of social networking platforms and Web 
2.0 services, the only digital investigative journalism remains the case of Odatv.com. On 3 March 2011, 14 
defendants from a news website called Oda TV, including the investigative journalists Ahmet Şık and Nedim 
Şener, were jailed on accusations of reporting and writing in the service of an alleged terrorist conspiracy 
known as Ergenekon. Th e full text of the 134-page indictment contained charges that caused wide public 
outrage and waves of protest.84 Th us, besides the problem of authenticity, digitization in Turkey may have 
encouraged new threats to journalists, bloggers, and political activists.
84. Milliyet Daily, “Nedim ile Ahmet’in 200. Gününe Protesto” (Protesting Nedim’s and Ahmet’s 200th Day in Prison), 19 September 2011, at 
http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/nedim-ile-ahmet-in-200-gunune-protesto/gundem/gundemdetay/19.09.2011/1440097/default.htm (accessed 
19 November 2011).
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With the widespread use of blogs and social networking sites, digitization has also allowed think-tank 
organizations, activists, and researchers to become more familiar with domestic politics, ongoing political 
conﬂ icts, and public perceptions in Turkey. Th e Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Türkiye 
Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı, TESEV) is the primary think-tank, publishing reports online and free on 
media democracy, the political economy of the media, democratization, and human rights, all of which help 
to raise public awareness of sensitive issues.85
4.3 Social and Cultural Diversity
4.3.1 Sensitive Issues
Th e major sensitive issues in Turkey can be listed as the rights of ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities, 
mass killings of Armenians, and ongoing debates on EU accession standards. Th e issue of minority rights—
particularly of the Kurds, who comprise 17 percent of the population—has long been central in Turkey, and 
there have been major developments in the past decade, largely driven by Turkey’s desire to join the EU.
Between 2001 and 2004, before Turkey began its formal negotiations on EU accession, the government 
made a serious attempt to improve observation of human rights in general and ethnic-minority rights in 
particular. In 2009, the government announced its intention to introduce Kurdish-language broadcasting, 
permit Kurdish-language teaching in schools and universities, and allow the reintroduction of Kurdish place 
names in south-eastern Anatolia, with the aim of isolating the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Parti Karkerani 
Kurdistan, PKK), the main militant Kurdish organization, which has waged a bloody armed struggle against 
the Turkish state since 1984. Th is “Kurdish Opening,” or “Democratic Opening” as it was described in 
oﬃ  cial statements, ground to a halt after groups of separatist Kurds who had been living in refugee camps 
in northern Iraq started returning to Turkey in October 2009 and were welcomed as heroes by Kurds in 
Turkey—a welcome, broadcast on national television, that outraged Turkish public opinion. Small-scale 
reforms on the Kurdish issue still remain on the government’s agenda, but there is no sign that it is prepared 
to oﬀ er the Kurds more democratic control over their aﬀ airs. 
Apart from the Kurdish problem, there are various delicate issues where journalists are expected to follow 
the oﬃ  cial ideology, such as the Armenian genocide controversy. Th e journalists’ sharp criticism of Turkey’s 
human rights violations, the perpetual civil war taking place in the south-eastern part of Anatolia, or any 
topic that challenges oﬃ  cial rhetoric in respect of national history can carry a heavy price for journalists. 
4.3.2 Coverage of Sensitive Issues
In harmony with EU legislation, radio and television outlets may apply for permission to produce minority-
language programs. Th ese are limited 60 minutes per day and ﬁ ve hours per week for radios, and 45 minutes 
85. See http://www.tesev.org.tr (accessed 24 November 2011).
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per day and four hours per week for television corporations. Under these regulations, TRT has broadcast in 
Zaza, Bosnian, Arabic, Circassian, and Kurmanji languages on TRT Radio 1 and TRT 3 since 2004.
Coverage of sensitive issues remains patchy and is rare in the mainstream media; it is mostly conﬁ ned to 
alternative news portals.
It is not directly regulated by the state or law. However, since the mainstream media are quite nationalistic, 
jingoistic, and right-wing, coverage of sensitive issues such as non-Muslim identities, gender issues, and 
homosexuality is shaped by the conservative Islamists, who at times incite hate speech. Th e internet has a huge 
impact on the discussion of those long-standing taboos by providing a new platform for open discussion. Th e 
best example is the debate about the Kurdish minority. With the aid of digitization, Kurdish language and 
culture have become more accessible as Kurdish television channels and free Kurdish music production have 
become available on the internet.
By the same token, coverage of Mr Dink by mainstream newspapers and their online versions was ultra-
nationalistic prior to his murder (see section 3.2.1). Th e media made him a target for ultra-nationalist groups 
by claiming that he was insisting on the Armenian genocide and thereby insulting Turkish identity in general 
and one of modern Turkey’s iconic ﬁ gures in particular, Sabiha Gökçen, who was of Armenian origin.86
4.3.3 Space for Public Expression
Digitization has aﬀ ected the space for minorities to express themselves by enlarging it. However, its inﬂ uence 
remains limited. Among the exceptions are Amargi (see section 3.2.2) and Lambda Istanbul (the Turkish 
branch of a gay and lesbian advocacy group in the United States).87 Although there are new formations 
such as Jiyan, established to support equal rights for Turkish citizens living in Turkey, such websites based 
on voluntary journalism can only appeal to a limited number of social groups due to their limited access to 
ﬁ nancial resources.88
Even a quick search can oﬀ er plenty of websites such as Kurdistan Net, Kurdish info, Kurdistan Press, Kurdish 
News, Kurdish Globe, Kurdistan Observer, Kurdistan Post, Zkurd, WeKurd and Kurdish Media, that show 
how the Kurds in general and the Kurdish diaspora in particular have an insigniﬁ cant presence in terms of 
appealing to a wide group of individuals in cyberspace. While these groups use the internet to expand their 
expression, regular followers and contributors of the aforementioned online platforms are limited.
86. Sabiha Gökçen was a Turkish aviatrix, and one of the eight adopted children of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the Republic of Turkey.
87. See http://www.amargi.org.tr/; http://www.lambdaistanbul.org/s (accessed 24 December 2011).
88. See http://jiyan.us (accessed 26 December 2011).
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4.4 Political Diversity
4.4.1 Elections and Political Coverage
Digitization has not yet caused any changes in the regulation of elections coverage. Th e internet has an indirect 
inﬂ uence on Turkish politics as it allows for measuring public opinion with unoﬃ  cial election surveys held on 
daily newspapers’ websites and social networks. During the 2007 elections, voting online was also put on the 
agenda of the government, although it has not happened yet. Columnists argue that voting online could take 
place during elections, as the “e-government” application, which provides certain services such as ID card 
renewal upon online request, could be improved in order to provide this service for citizens.89
With the increased and widespread use of the internet in society, there have not been many radical changes 
in the press coverage of elections and politics. However, the online coverage of the most recent election in 
Turkey proved that digital platforms are becoming more inﬂ uential, challenging the power of television and 
printed media. Th roughout the 2011 elections, social media platforms such as Twitter emerged as eﬀ ective 
sources providing up-to-date information. While several journalists tweeted the election results of local 
regions before the results at country level were revealed, Oda TV and Tivibu were broadcasting online and 
hosting guest speakers to comment on rival political parties. Election programs on NTV and Tivibu were 
also broadcast by YouTube, and public discussions were conducted on Twitter with hashtags #secim2011 
(election2011). Online editions of printed newspapers, as well as approximately 40 news web portals such as 
T24 and Medya73.com also broadcast Tivibu programs live.  
4.4.2 Digital Political Communications
Digital political communications have fostered the emergence of a more transparent political environment 
in Turkey. Political parties such as AKP have been using the opportunity to become more transparent by 
publishing daily press reports on their oﬃ  cial websites.90 AKP’s utilization of the internet is explained by 
Suat Kılıç, the party’s vice-president in charge of publicity, with the following statement on government 
strategy: “Th e internet, especially information and communication technologies have a special meaning, 
which provides an invaluable opportunity for all of us. Hence, claiming to stay away from information and 
communication technologies in the age of information would be a sign of narrow-mindedness.”91
Th e internet has not had a strong inﬂ uence on the increasing numbers and the variety of actors in the political 
sphere. Before the 2011 elections, political parties such as AKP and CHP opened online platforms to bring 
in young supporters. Supporters also express their political views through promoting political parties by 
launching groups on Facebook.
89. Hürriyet Daily, “İnternet Üzerinden Oy Kullanabilir miyiz?” (Can We Vote Online?), 27 April 2010, at http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dun-
ya/14544732.asp (accessed 12 February 2012).
90. AkParti Basın Raporu (AKP Media Report), at http://www.akparti.org.tr/gunluk-basin-raporu_7087.html (accessed 14 November 2011).
91. Türk İnternet, “AKP Bilinçli İnternet Kampanyası Yapıyor” (AKP Starts Campaign on Internet Awareness), 20 December 2006, at http://www.
turk.internet.com/portal/yazigoster.php?yaziid=17096 (accessed 13 November 2011).
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Politicians such as Abdullah Gül,92 the current president, and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu,93 chairman of the CHP, 
also use Twitter actively by sharing their opinions on ongoing political aﬀ airs and commentaries on their 
business travels, as already noted. However, this communication is one-way and they do not respond to 
messages from the public. Political actors are not personally involved in the process of communicating with 
their supporters and followers.
4.5 Assessments
Digitization has yet to make a major impact on investigative journalism in Turkey, and it is not the key issue. 
Much more important is the malign inﬂ uence of the law, notably the draconian Criminal Code and Law 
on Fighting Terrorism, and the predominance of columnists rather than in-depth reporting in newspapers. 
Insofar as there has been good investigative journalism in Turkey, however, it has been resourced and published 
by traditional newspapers rather than by digital media. Although digital media have not yet radically aﬀ ected 
the coverage of elections in Turkey, however, hopes and expectations of their potential run high for future 
elections among young journalists.
Although journalists interpret the digital switch-over process as important to reach global news resources 
and engage with their readers on social media networks, digitization has also exacerbated the problem of 
the Turkish media publishing unveriﬁ ed and unchecked stories. On the other hand, it has also had certain 
positive eﬀ ects in terms of spreading diverse ideas on social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and Blogger. 
Th e internet has also broken taboos by providing a platform for Kurdish television channels and Kurdish 
music producers.
Th ere are no investigative journalism blogs in Turkey, but Twitter has become a useful tool for journalists to 
publicize their work, share their opinions, and engage with their followers. Certain leaders of political parties 
and the president are also active users of Twitter, but they do not interact with their followers.
92. Twitter account of Abdullah Gül, at https://twitter.com/cbabdullahgul (accessed 2 February 2012).
93. Twitter account of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, at http://twitter.com/kilicdarogluk (accessed 2 February 2012).
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5. Digital Media and Technology
5.1 Spectrum
5.1.1 Spectrum Allocation Policy
Th e main institutions for regulating spectrum allocation are RTÜK and BTK.94 Th ere is currently no 
hierarchical relationship between these bodies, which operate independently from each other. While the 
duties of RTÜK are explained in the constitution, the operational tasks of BTK are not mentioned clearly 
in any legal provisions. In September 2011, Mr Yıldırım (Minister of Transport and Communications) said 
that these two institutions may merge in the near future, as they have similar duties in spectrum allocation 
and regulating visual and audio data transfer.95 
BTK plays the more active role, especially in regulating mobile telephony spectrum allocation. According to 
the National Spectrum Allocation Plan published by BTK in 2009,96 RTÜK is responsible for implementing 
television and radio spectrum allocation.
Th e National Spectrum Allocation Plan also stipulates rules on registration of mobile telephony services. 
According to Art. 8, applicant service providers should establish the infrastructure of their wireless device 
systems before ﬁ ling an application to BTK. To start operating, applicants must wait for the approval of BTK 
to receive an operation license.
While the National Spectrum Allocation Plan is presented as complying with teh EU acquis communautaire 
and decisions by regional and international organizations such as the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Civil Aviation Organization 
94. BTK, “Brief Historical Account,” at http://www.the BTK.gov.tr/Kurum_Hakkinda/Tarihce_2000.htm (accessed 12 February 2011). Th e role of 
BTK was little altered by the Law on Electronic Communications (no. 5809) that changed its name. Its income comes from a levy of a maximum 
of 5 percent on the annual net sales of media service providers, proﬁ ts from seminars and education fairs, donations, and ﬁ nes.
95. Yeni Şafak, “RTÜK ile BTK Birleşebilir” (RTÜK and BTK May Merge), 25 December 2009, at http://yenisafak.com.tr/bilisim/?i=231027 
(accessed 12 January 2011).
96. BTK, Spektrum Yönetimi Yönetmeliği (Spectrum Management Regulations), 2009 (hereafter BTK, Spektrum Yönetimi Yönetmeliği).
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(ICAO), and the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT), it 
prioritizes the needs and requests of the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs, the Turkish General Staﬀ , and the 
Turkish Coast Guard Command. Under Art. 7 of the Allocation Plan, requests by these institutions must 
be strictly prioritized by the regulator during the license application procedure. Th us, the current allocation 
plan gives speciﬁ c privileges to regional and international organizations. Currently, the plan has no articles 
on the regulation of digital spectrum allocation policy. Th e digital and terrestrial frequency share of both 
radio and television stations are governed according the same plan with no privileges provided to any public 
or commercial broadcaster.  
5.1.2 Transparency
Licenses for spectrum allocation are all issued by BTK. Art. 5 of the National Spectrum Allocation Plan 
stipulates transparent and ethical competition among applicants as well as eﬃ  cient use of allocated spectrum.97 
Th e institution transparently explains that obtaining a license is a procedure based on applications by media 
service providers in public tenders.
According to the frequency allocation plan:
 applicants should establish the infrastructure of their operation system prior to obtaining a license from 
BTK;
 during the consideration period of applications, requests of the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs, the Turkish 
Coast Guard Command, and the Turkish General Staﬀ  must be prioritized;
 RTÜK is responsible for the radio and television spectrum allocation and its eﬃ  cient use in accordance 
with the National Spectrum Allocation Plan;
 BTK may take minimal precautions, such as ﬁ nes, when wireless communication service providers exceed 
their frequency allocation;
 BTK may impose restrictions on wireless communication service providers in issues related to transmitter 
power, antenna type, and the direction and height of the antenna.
Th e regulations mentioned above have been applied by RTÜK and BTK after issuing licenses to applicants 
without public tender. Th is process remains problematic, as the National Spectrum Allocation Plan covers in 
a single document both applications for radio and television services, and mobile telephony. Moreover, BTK 
has been publishing comparative reports on the frequency allocation plans of European countries, which can 
be interpreted as a sign of collecting data for a more detailed and transparent spectrum allocation plan to be 
provided in the near future.  
97. BTK, Spektrum Yönetimi Yönetmeliği.
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5.1.3 Competition for Spectrum
Th ere was no competition for spectrum in Turkey before the beginning of the 1990s because TRT had a 
broadcasting monopoly. Th is came to an end with the emergence of commercial television channels. Professor 
Hayrettin Köymen, an expert in wireless telecommunications from Bilkent University, explains: “With the 
start of the liberalization of the sector when private broadcasters appeared, the need to ensure proper sharing 
of the spectrum among the television channels emerged as an issue.”98 In February 2011, Davut Dursun, the 
chairman of RTÜK, explained that the institution had been working on organizing the ﬁ rst public tender for 
16 years, to provide 10-year licenses.
For mobile telephony frequency allocation, public tenders on 2G and 3G communication systems have been 
held regularly in the last ﬁ ve years, following BTK approval. During the 2008 tender, Turkcell, Avea, and 
Vodafone competed for spectrum, and the tender was won by Turkcell after becoming the highest bidder, 
oﬀ ering € 348 million. In February 2011, Erkan Akdemir, the CEO of Avea, called for the anticipated 4G 




Th ere are currently no debates conducted at public level or by professional experts on the adoption of 
gatekeeping standards for digital platforms. Th ere is still an ongoing operation by BTK to adopt technical 
standards for digital broadcasting. As a member of the ITU and an observer member of the European 
Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI), BTK announced in 2011 that it had been working on 
adopting technical standards in line with developments in the digital telecommunication sector, and to ensure 
harmony with World Trade Organization (WTO) and European Union (EU) standards. Digital standards 
that are expected to be implemented speciﬁ cally for Turkey in the near future remain secret, however, and no 
debates at public level are being conducted to measure audience perception and choices.
5.2.2 Gatekeepers
Th ere are currently no operators playing a gatekeeping role in Turkey. 
5.2.3 Transmission Networks
Th ere have not been any publicized problems over the operation of transmission networks, as no detailed 
information, report, or statement has been revealed on the establishment and structure of anticipated 
transmission networks. BTK presented the Digital Television Broadcasting Plan in 2006 to the Communi-
98. Interview with Hayrettin Köymen, TRT, “Frekans İhlali: Önce Yasa Çıktı, Sonra Tartışmaya Başladık” (Violations of Frequencies: We Started the 
Debate Only After the Law Got Accepted), at http://www.emo.org.tr/ekler/93f65e080a295f8_ek.pdf?dergi=4 (accessed 23 December 2011).
99. Bilgi Çağı, “Avea Yeni ve Adil Frekans Dağıtımı İstedi” (Avea Asks for Fair Frequency Distribution), 23 February 2011, at http://www.bilgicagi.
com/Yazilar/4874-avea_yeni_ve_adil_frekans_dagitimi_istedi.aspx (accessed 23 December 2011).
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cations High Council (Haberleşme Yüksek Kurulu), the nominated partner of RTÜK, to approve communi-
cation policies. Following the approval of the plan, a new transmission company called Anten AŞ was 
established to build digital television broadcasting platforms. Anten AŞ was to be formed by the Television 
Broadcasters’ Association (Televizyon Yayıncıları Derneği).100 Th e company was anticipated to start operations 
in 13 major cities and then extend to other areas of the country in 2007.
According to the Digital Television Broadcasting Plan, members of Anten AŞ, including TRT and private 
competitors such as ATV, Star, Show TV, Kanal 7, NTV, and CNN Türk, would oﬀ er digital terrestrial 
broadcasts in parallel with the existing analog services throughout the switch-over period. Th e plan also 
included the decision that four broadcasts would be made available at the same time from a single transmission 
frequency. 
Th ere has been no evidence since 2007 of whether operations started in 13 major cities, or whether the 
transmission networks have been extended to other areas of the country. While there is no oﬃ  cial document 
available on the current operation of Anten AŞ, the structure of the company and its plans on digital 
broadcasting are anticipated to be made available in 2014, the estimated date to complete the transition 
process and to start digital broadcasting in Turkey.
5.3 Telecommunications
5.3.1 Telecoms and News
Th e major role of telecoms companies in Turkey is to provide integrated communication services, including 
the Global System for Mobile communication (GSM), Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), and 
the internet, while cable companies are the primary actors in oﬀ ering cable television services. Telecoms 
companies are major carriers of news services through their cable operations, as well as providing the primetime 
news programs provided by TRT and its private commercial rivals. Cable operators routinely oﬀ er domestic 
24-hour news channels, and Digitürk oﬀ ers a news package that includes global television channels such as 
Bloomberg Television, TV5 Monde, CNN, Al Jazeera, and BBC World News.
Th e dominant ﬁ xed-line telecoms provider is Türk Telekom, the former state-owned telecoms company 
established in 1995 after the separation of telecoms and postal services and privatized in 2005, when 
Oger Telekomünikasyon bought a 55 percent stake for US$ 6.55 billion. Türk Telekom is also a major 
international telecoms supplier, ranking ﬁ fth in Europe and 13th in the world.101 Th e company has been 
providing Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL), PSTN, Videofon, Wirofon, and Metro Ethernet 
100. Th e Television Broadcasters’ Association deﬁ nes itself as the spokesman of RTÜK on their oﬃ  cial website, although it has no oﬃ  cial bureaucratic 
ties with the government.
101. “About Türk Telekom,” at http://www.turktelekom.com.tr/tt/portal/TTHakkinda/KurumsalTanitim/Hakkinda (accessed 2 May 2011).
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services to its customers. Türk Telekom oﬀ ers services in ﬁ xed line, mobile, data, and cable television to more 
than 20 million subscribers and is currently in the process of creating an IPTV service that is expected to be 
working very soon.102
All mobile phone operators in Turkey oﬀ er service packages for their customers, many of which include 
news. Turkcell, the biggest mobile operator with 55 percent of the market in 2010, has presented the widest 
range of mobile services and oﬀ ers Anadolu Ajansı News Services,103 3G NTV News Package, and access to 
UZMAN TV videos.104 Vodafone (with a 27 percent market share) and Avea (with 18 percent) also oﬀ er 
3G social network services that include news packages, despite their inability to provide as wide a variety of 
services as Turkcell.105 No obligations are currently imposed on telecoms companies as news providers.
   
5.3.2 Pressure of Telecoms on News Providers
Th ere is little evidence of pressure being exerted by telecoms companies on news providers, although Turkcell 
did have a major run-in with the DMG after it decided not to advertise in Doğan media in 2008. According 
to the news of Haber 7, Mehmet Emin Karamehmet, the owner of Çukurova Group, had close ties with 
the government, and pressured Turkcell not to advertise in outlets of DMG due to the company’s high 
advertising tariﬀ s imposed in 2006.106
Aydın Doğan, the owner of DMG, responded by accusing Turkcell of insulting the heritage of modern 
Turkey’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,107 because it sponsored a popular comedy movie, Recep İvedik, 
instead of a documentary about Atatürk, and declared a boycott of the telecoms company.108 Th e media 
group oﬃ  cials claimed that Turkcell did not want the sponsorship to ﬂ aw their ties with the government.109
102. See http://www.turktelekomburada.com/default.asp?sayfa=iptv (accessed 12 November 2011).
103. Anadolu Ajansı is one of the major news agencies in Turkey, established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1920, during the war of independence.
104. Uzman TV is a website sharing expert videos for people seeking information about a variety of issues including health, cosmetic surgery, 
astrology, and sports.
105. Until 2004, Turkcell, Telsim, Aria, and Aycell were the major mobile communications operators in Turkey. In April 2004, Aria merged with 
Aycell under a new name, Avea, and the new company oﬀ ered a wide range of improved services with diﬀ erent tariﬀ s. Telsim, the second largest 
operator in Turkey, was sold in 2005 to the British company Vodafone, which oﬀ ered the highest bid of US$ 550 million during the auction. 
As a result, Avea and Vodafone emerged as major rivals of Turkcell, the holder of the largest share in the market. Turkcell is also the corporation 
known for having paid the highest taxes in the country in 2009, amounting to TL 675,780,000, thus exceeding the tax costs of Türk Telekom, 
which ranked second. See http://www.avea.com.tr/tr/sta/doyadoya/teknoloji.shtml.
106. Haber 7, “Turkcell Reklamı Niçin, Ne Vakit Kesti?” (When Did Turkcell Stop Advertising?), 30 October 2008, at http://www.haber7.com/
haber/20081030/Turkcell-reklami-nicin-ne-vakit-kesti.php (accessed 12 January 2011).
107. Haber 7, “Doğan Medya Kendi Evladını Yedi” (Doğan Media Gave up on His Son), 30 0ctober 2008, at http://www.haber7.com/
haber/20081030/Dogan-Medyasi-kendi-evladini-yedi.php (accessed 12 January 2011).
108. Vatan Daily, “Recep İvedik’e Var, Mustafa’ya Yok” (Yes to Recep İvedik, No to Mustafa), 28 October 2008, at http://haber.gazetevatan.com/
Haber/206014/1/Gundem (accessed 13 February 2011).
109. Habertürk, “Reklam için Şantaj” (Advertising Blackout), 30 October 2008 at http://www.haberturk.com/medya/haber/105669-reklam-icin-
santaj (accessed 12 January 2011).
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5.4 Assessments
Th e implementation of the allocation plan and spectrum distribution are closed-door processes, and are 
politicized because of the prioritization of government requests. BTK recognizes the newly emerging 
technologies, and explains that it is a long and complicated process to reorganize the current spectrum 
allocation in accordance with international standards.110 Th e spectrum allocation plan is under threat of 
becoming old-fashioned in a very short time, since it currently oﬀ ers the same standards for analog and 
digital broadcasting.111
Th e National Spectrum Allocation Plan’s methods are paradoxical because it prioritizes requests of government 
branches and seeks fair competition among its applicants at the same time. While the regulations for sustaining 
fair competition are transparently explained in the plan, together with the prioritization exceptions, BTK 
does not provide detailed information about its processes and the consequences of implementation. 
Digital broadcasting is in its infancy in Turkey. Th ere has been little eﬀ ort to develop the structure of institutions 
such as Anten AŞ, or to coordinate the switch-over process in partnership with TRT and commercial television 
broadcasters. 2014 stands as a key date to anticipate further regulations on the operation of digital media 
service providers. Th e current spectrum allocation plan remains ineﬀ ective.
Recent collaborations between Anadolu Ajansı and Turkcell indicate the development of new digital services 
to be oﬀ ered by telecoms companies in the near future. Th e government also plays an invisible but key role 
in the determination of collaborations between telecoms companies and digital media service providers, as 
media companies with close relations with the government presently hold a privileged position in inﬂ uencing 
relations between telecoms and anti-government media groups. Th e public interest has no role during the 
processes of spectrum allocation and regulation.
110. BTK, Spektrumda Serbestleşme ve Yeni Eğilimler (Liberalization of Spectrum and Main Trends), 2010, at http://www.tk.gov.tr/kutuphane_ve_
veribankasi/raporlar/arastirma_raporlari/dosyalar/Spektrumda_Serbestlesme_Yeni_Egilimler.pdf (accessed 17 May 2011).
111. BTK, Spektrumda Serbestleşme ve Yeni Eğilimler (Liberalization of Spectrum and Main Trends), 2010, at http://www.tk.gov.tr/kutuphane_ve_
veribankasi/raporlar/arastirma_raporlari/dosyalar/Spektrumda_Serbestlesme_Yeni_Egilimler.pdf (accessed 17 May 2011).
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6. Digital Business
6.1 Ownership
6.1.1 Legal Developments in Media Ownership
Th e legal developments in media ownership are relevant for both analog and digital operations. Th e digital 
media ownership still lacks a digital-speciﬁ c legal framework that is applicable to media owners. A new law on 
media ownership in Turkey, the Law on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and Broadcast 
Enterprises and their Media Services (no. 6112), was passed in February 2011, replacing a 1994 law with the 
same name (no. 3984).
Th e maximum foreign stake allowed in Turkish media companies rises from 25 percent to 50 percent under 
the new legislation, which also makes changes to the regulatory framework on questions other than ownership, 
including bringing TRT under the supervision of RTÜK.112
Th e new law also requires companies that are about to take over or merge with others to seek permission from 
RTÜK and to inform it about transactions not later than 30 days after their completion.113
Broadcasting licenses can no longer be allocated to political parties, labor or employer unions, professional 
associations, cooperatives, foundations, local government bodies, companies established or partially owned by 
these institutions or ﬁ nancial institutions, and real and corporate entities that partially own these intermediary 
institutions.114 None of these organizations may own a share of a media service provider. It is an important 
step taken for the promotion of diversity and the prevention of political and commercial manipulation of 
Turkish media outlets. 
112. Law no. 3984.
113. Haber 7, “RTÜK’ten Yayın Yasağı Yetkisi Başbakana” (Increasing Authority of RTÜK Over Banning Inappropriate Content), 16 February 
2011, at http://www.haber7.com/haber/20110216/RTUKte-yayin-yasagi-yetkisi-basbakana.php (accessed 12 March 2011) (hereafter Haber 7, 
“RTÜK’ten Yayın Yasağı Yetkisi Başbakana”).
114. Haber 7, “RTÜK’ten Yayın Yasağı Yetkisi Başbakana.”
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6.1.2 New Entrants in the News Market
Th e primary new actor in the Turkish media market is Habertürk, owned and established by Ciner Yayın 
Holding in March 2009. Th e daily paper Habertürk and the television channel Habertürk TV have challenged 
the dominance of major actors in the Turkish news media sector (see section 1.3.1.1). Habertürk also became 
one of the key sources of online news media. According to research by IAB, Haberturk.com.tr became the 
third news website, with the highest number of unique visitors in December 2011, following the online 
outlets of Milliyet Daily and Hürriyet Daily.115
Th e latest player in the news market will be Al Jazeera Turkey, to be launched at the end of 2011. Earlier in 
the year, the government approved the sale of the television channel Cine 5 to Al Jazeera. Cine 5 had been 
administered by a government-run fund since its owner’s business ran into economic trouble. Al Jazeera 
paid US$ 40.5 million for Cine5 in a public auction. Th e Turkish partner of Al Jazeera, Vural Ak, indicated 
that the technological infrastructure is almost complete and 300 people have already been recruited in the 
ﬁ rst phase. Th e number of employees for this channel will eventually reach 600.116 Given the increasing 
signiﬁ cance of Turkey for the Arab world and the sympathy for the Turkish prime minister after the Arab 
Spring, Al Jazeera’s launch created excitement in the media sector. 
6.1.3 Ownership Consolidation
Media ownership in Turkey is highly concentrated. A handful of massive media groups—DMG, Çalık 
Group, Çukurova Holding, Doğuş Group, İhlas Holding, and Feza Group—own the overwhelming majority 
of media outlets. Th ey are also key investors in other sectors of the economy including health, education, 
construction, telecoms, and retail. 
Bound by RTÜK regulations, the outlets most critical of the AKP government in recent years have been owned 
by the giant DMG, which has been embroiled in a long-running, high-proﬁ le battle with the government 
over tax—and at least some of its antipathy towards the AKP should be put down to commercial self-interest. 
Its outlets’ criticisms of the government have not extended to the Kurdish question, Cyprus, or the Armenian 
genocide controversy, on all of which issues they take a hard nationalist line. Th ey have taken a particularly 
close interest in the case of three Turkish men convicted in Germany in 2008 for the illegal channelling of 
US$ 26 million raised by a big Islamic charity association, Deniz Feneri (Lighthouse), to sponsor pro-AKP 
companies in Turkey, including an Islamic television channel, Kanal 7. DMG outlets alleged that Prime 
Minister Tayyip Erdoğan had personally received some of the illegally transferred funds, and that the AKP 
government pressured the German authorities to release the three defendants.117 While DMG’s outlets took a 
critical stance towards the ruling AKP party, the government had a series of run-ins with it over the tax debts 
115. Haberden, “İşte İnternette En Çok Okunan Haber Siteleri” (Th e Most Read News Websites Revealed), 30 January 2012, at http://www.haberden.
com/haber/20120130/Iste-internette-en-cok-okunan-haber-siteleri.php (accessed 2 February 2012).
116. Deutsche Welle Turkish Service, “El Cezire İddialı Geliyor” (Al Jazeera On Th e Way), 14 February 2011, at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/arti-
cle/0,,14841176,00.html (accessed 16 March 2011).
117. D. Çatalbaş, “Divided and Confused: Reporting of the First Two Weeks of the War in Iraq on Turkish Television Channels,” Transnational 
Broadcasting Studies 10 (2003), at http://www.tbsjournal.com/Archives/Spring03/catalbas%20turkey.html (accessed 4 November 2011).
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of Mr Doğan. Th e process continued with negotiations between Mr Doğan and oﬃ  cials of the Ministry of 
Finance which resulted in the conﬁ scation of Doğan TV holding stocks in 2009. After a deal between DMG 
and the government to reduce the tax burden, this coverage came to an abrupt halt. 
DMG holds a dominant share both in the circulation of the country’s leading newspapers and in the 
advertising revenue of television channels. DMG is responsible for 40 percent of the total circulation of 
national newspapers, and DMG-controlled television attracts 25–30 percent of the viewing audience every 
night.118 DMG currently owns 26 television channels, including the popular channels Kanal D and Star TV 
and the dedicated news channel CNN Türk; four radio stations; eight daily newspapers, Hürriyet, Milliyet, 
Radikal, Vatan, Posta, Fanatik, Referans, and Turkish Daily News; 27 magazines; one digital platform, D-Smart; 
one distribution company, Yay-Sat; one news agency, DHA; and around 25 news portals. DMG is a partner 
with Turner Broadcasting System in the cable channel TNT and has various international media holdings.
Th e latest development came on 20 April 2011 when DMG stated that it had agreed to sell its two major 
newspapers, Milliyet and Vatan, to the Demirören–Karacan joint venture for US$ 74 million: US$ 47.96 
million and US$ 26 million for Milliyet and Vatan, respectively. Th e Karacan family decided to set up 
a partnership with Demirören Group (DG), whose main interests are the distribution and retail sale of 
Liqueﬁ ed Petroleum Gas (LPG), petroleum, as well as real-estate development, construction, mining, and 
metal products. According to the circulation ﬁ gures, Milliyet and Vatan have a daily circulation of 140,000 
and 105,000 print copies, respectively.119 Combined, they hold a 6 percent share in the Turkish newspaper 
market, where over 30 newspapers sell a total of some 5 million print copies every day. After this sale, DMG 
still holds six daily newspapers, one of which is a sports daily. 
Th e second most important player in the Turkish media sector is Çalık Group. Its outlets have a 20 percent 
share of print media advertising and 23 percent of broadcast media advertising. Calik owns a television 
channel, ATV; six newspapers: Sabah, Takvim, Günaydın, Yeni Asır, Pas, and Fotomaç; 12 magazines; one radio 
station, Radio City; and a distribution company. Th e group is also active in energy, textile, and construction 
sectors. Its CEO, Berat Albayrak, is the son-in-law of the prime minister.
Çalık Group, a pro-government conglomerate, acquired the newspaper Sabah and ATV for US$ 1.1 billion 
in 2008. Th e sale aroused substantial controversy, not least because it was partially ﬁ nanced with loans of 
US$ 750 million from two state banks, Vakıf Bank and Halkbank, and was at a knockdown price, with Çalık 
being the sole bidder (see section 7.3.1).
Çukurova Holding is the third-biggest media company. It has 23 television channels, including Show TV 
and Sky TV; two radio stations, Alem FM and Show Radio; three newspapers, Akşam, Güneş, and Tercüman; 
eight magazines; and one digital platform, Digiturk. Çukurova has investments in telecoms, Turkcell, and 
Superonline, as well as assets in the construction, tourism, and aviation sectors.
118. See http://www.doganholding.com.tr/en/investments/media.aspx (accessed 5 October 2011).
119. Circulation numbers 12–18 September 2011, at http://www.medyatava.com/tiraj.asp (accessed 5 October 2011).
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Another strong player is Doğuş Group. It owns six news, entertainment, and sport television channels, NTV, 
NTV Sport, CNBC-e, e2, NBA TV, and Kral TV; seven radio stations, NTV Radio, Radio Eksen, Radio 
N101, Roket FM, Virgin Radio, Radio Voyage, and Nostalji FM; eight magazines; a publishing house; 
and internet portals. Doğuş Group is also one of the most powerful corporations in banking, ﬁ nance, the 
automotive sector, tourism, construction, and energy sectors. Th e conglomerate is known to have strong 
relations with the government, especially with the conglomerate oﬃ  cials’ participation in the tender for the 
Marmaray Project for electromechanical components.120 
İhlas Holding, a conservative Islamist corporation, owns Türkiye newspaper and İhlas News Agency (İhlas 
Haber Ajansı, İHA) along with nine magazines and one radio station. İhlas also invests in the construction 
and marketing sectors. In July 2006, the company sold all its shares in a television station, TGRT, to News 
Corporation for TL 151 million (US$ 98 million at the time), which marked the ﬁ rst entrance of a global 
player in the Turkish media market. 
Th ere are several other smaller actors in the media sector, among them Albayrak Group (Yeni şafak newspaper, 
TV NET), İpek Koza Holding (Kanaltürk TV, Bugün newspaper), Sancak Holding (Star newspaper, Kanal 
24 TV), MNG Group (TV8, MNG News Agency), Samanyolu (Samanyolu TV, Mehtap TV, Yumurcak TV 
and Burç Radio, Dünya Radio, S Haber Radio), and Yeni Dünya (Kanal 7, Kanal 7 İnt., Haber 7, Radio 7, 
İstanbul’un Sesi Radio, and TVT). Samanyolu and the Albayrak Group are the primary mergers among 
smaller actors in the media sector that increased the diversity of their news oﬀ er with their pro-Islamic 
orientation and news content. 
6.1.4 Telecoms Business and the Media
Th e Turkish information and communication technologies (ICT) market is one of the fastest growing in Europe. 
Much of this growth is due to the recent e-transformation project launched by the government to adapt the 
systems operating in EU countries, which is expected to be a tremendous boost to the telecoms market. 
E-government projects will create a huge demand for ICT companies.121 Th e “e-Government Gate” project 
was launched oﬃ  cially on 18 December 2008 by the prime minister. With this project, 22 public services 
were opened to citizens. As of today, the citizens of Turkey are able to access the services of more than 180 
public institutions and companies via Turkiye.gov.tr and carry out their transactions.
Additionally, the service providing access to e-Government Gate through mobile phones, called “Mobile 
Government,” was launched on 7 October 2009. With this service, citizens access the system through 
the website Wap.turkiye.gov.tr with the browsers on their mobile phones or by a Java application, which 
120. Marmaray is a rail transport project in Istanbul, which was outlined in 1987. Th e project is to construct an undersea rail tunnel under the 
Bosphorus strait.
121. “A Report on Telecommunications Technologies and Services,” by Tuğrul Görgün, 2010, at http://www.igeme.org.tr/Assets/sip/san/09STB023.
pdf (accessed 1 November 2011).
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they download to their devices and beneﬁ t from the mobile version of many services. Th e use of mobile 
technologies to enhance government activities, applications, and services is becoming increasingly popular.
A combination of the launch of mobile number portability in 2008 and the introduction of 3G mobile 
services in 2009 sparked cut-throat competition among Turkey’s three mobile operators, Turkcell, Avea, and 
Vodafone, which continues to this day. Th e advent of 3G also prompted Türk Telekom, Turkey’s ﬁ xed-line 
giant, to enter the mobile fray with a new product in order to take advantage of the rapidly growing demand 
for wireless data and voice services. 3G connections accounted for almost 10 percent of total connections 
in the country by the end of 2010 and 3G will account for more than a third of all Turkish connections 
(an estimated 30 million) by the end of 2013. Because competition in the telecoms sector is intensifying, 
operators are now looking for new sources of revenue to sustain and increase their market share. 
As one of the key players, Türk Telekom is currently the leading communication and convergence technology 
group in the country. Türk Telekom was separated from the Post Oﬃ  ce in 1995 and a decade later it was 
privatized when 55 percent of the shares were bought by Oger Telekomünikasyon, leaving 30 percent in the 
hands of the state, while the remaining 15 percent of shares were oﬀ ered to the public (see section 5.3.1). 
6.1.5 Transparency of Media Ownership
Th ere is no legislation requiring media to disclose ownership information to the public. Deals, tenders, and 
mergers are opaque. Th is has allowed an increasingly close relationship between the political establishment 
(particularly the ruling party, AKP), the Islamic networks, and media conglomerates. Media outlets that are 
close to the political authorities gain materially and become propaganda tools.122
6.2 Media Funding
6.2.1 Public and Private Funding
TRT receives the majority of its income (60 percent in 2008) from a levy on the revenues of the Turkish 
Electricity Distribution Authority (Turkiye Elektrik Dagitim AŞ, TEDAŞ). A tax on sales of radio and television 
receivers brings in roughly 30 percent of TRT’s income. Th e regular public funding received from the annual 
electricity revenues and the tax on sales of radio and television receivers have ensured TRT’s ﬁ nancial stability 
over the last two decades. Th e rest of TRT’s income derives from advertising (4 percent) and government 
grants. Almost 1 percent of TRT revenue comes from its international radio and television services such as the 
Voice of Turkey (the radio station broadcasting in 26 languages), TRT-TÜRK (television station broadcasting 
in Europe, Australia, and the United States), and TRT Avaz (television station broadcasting in the Balkans, 
Central Asia, and the Caucasus). Despite its diminishing audience and increasing reaction by opposition 
MPs and columnists against its pro-government editorial policy, there is no public pressure to end the public 
funding of TRT. (See Table 14.)
122. C. Sözeri and Z. Güney, Türkiye’de Medyanın Ekopolitiği. Sektör Analizi, TESEV Demokratikleşme Programı, İstanbul, 2011.
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Table 14.
Net income of TRT, breakdown by revenue source (in €), 2003–2008
Source of revenue 
(% of total)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Tax on electricity 65.11 53.36 50.11 55.51 57.15 60.38
Sales tax 16.99 24.22 35.39 33.47 33.14 32.50
Advertising 11.93 13.90 8.70 7.00 6.31 3.94
Budget revenues (TRT–INT) 0.62 3.03 1.81 1.24 0.94 0.71
Other 5.35 5.49 3.98 2.79 2.46 2.47
Total net income (€) 210,241,060 233,337,796 315,215,830 295,909,129 343,487,801 352,920,412
Source: Turkish Radio and Television Corporation Data on Net Income of TRT, 2009.
TRT’s heavy ﬁ nancial reliance on electricity bills has been criticized by major newspapers such as Milliyet 
Daily, who have claimed that the amount of TRT’s income received from the public has surpassed the rate 
of any European public broadcaster.123 While the stable income received from electricity bills comprises 
the majority of TRT’s budget, it has still lagged behind private broadcasters in terms of creating for itself 
alternative ﬁ nancial sources by encouraging traditional and online advertising investments to ensure its 
sustainability. Th e electricity levy also remains detrimental to the public interest because it forces citizens 
to pay regular amounts to sustain TRT with their electricity bills on a monthly basis. Th e current income 
mechanism of TRT is dependent on payments made by citizens, and dismisses the potential ﬁ nancial sources 
of the private sector, which could make a great contribution to the budget.
Although advertising income does not constitute an essential part of TRT’s budget, the increases in advertising 
expenditures ensure that private broadcasters receive a stable income on a regular basis. In 2011, it was 
revealed that the advertising income received by national broadcasters almost doubled.124 Th ere is also a 
regular increase in income received through online advertising, as the growth during the ﬁ rst half of 2011 
was recorded as 23 percent.125
Private broadcasters rely largely on advertising income. Th e television share of total Turkish advertising 
spending is 56 percent. Th e radio share is 3 percent and the internet share, 7 percent.126
123. Milliyet Daily, “Elektrik Faturaları TRT’yi Zengin Etti” (Electricity Bills Made TRT Rich) 21 December 2011, at http://ekonomi.milliyet.com.
tr/elektirik-faturalari-trt-yi-zengin-etti/ekonomi/ekonomidetay/21.12.2011/1478463/default.htm (accessed 1 January 2012).
124. Zaman Daily, “Ulusal Televizyonların Gelirleri %50 arttı” (Income of National Television Increased by 50%), 26 November 2011, at http://www.
zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=1206697&title=ulusal-televizyonlarin-reklam-gelirleri-yuzde-50-artti (accessed 23 December 2011).
125. MediaCat Online, “Online Reklam Gelirleri %23 Arttı” (Online Revenues Increased by 23%), 20 September 2011, at http://www.mediacaton-
line.com/Home/HaberDetay?haberid=53014 (accessed 22 October 2011).
126. Financial Times, “Turkey: Advertising Spending Rises by 36.3 percent in First Half of 2010,” 6 August 2010, at http://www.ﬁ nchannel.com/
Main_News/Business/69084_Turkey%3A_Advertising_spending_rises_by_36.3_percent_in_ﬁ rst_half_of_2010 (accessed 23 December 2011) 
(hereafter Financial Times, “Turkey: Advertising Spending Rises”).
6 1O P E N  S O C I E T Y  M E D I A  P R O G R A M     2 0 1 2
According to the Advertisers’ Association (Reklamcılar Derneği), advertising spending in Turkey rose by 
36 percent in the ﬁ rst half of 2010 to TL 1.84 billion (US$ 1.2 billion) and is expected to increase by 
more than 30 percent by the end of 2010, when the total size of the advertising sector is likely to reach TL 
3.7 billion (US$ 2.1 billion).127 As the advertising sector has been only marginally aﬀ ected by the ﬁ nancial 
crisis, the revenue received from online and oﬄ  ine advertising is expected to increase throughout 2012.128 
(See Table 15.)
Table 15. 
Advertising expenditure, by platform, TL million, 2005–2010
Platforms 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Television 1,140 1,442 1,760 1,687 1,442 2,018
Press (newspapers) 805 914 990 952 746 856
Press (magazines) 85 106 123 114 72 86
Radio 85 160 235 242 198 104
Outdoor 110 101 111 112 88 252
Cinema 80 33 36 39 29 45
Internet 28 35 53 95 182 252
Total 2,343 2,791 3,308 3,241 2,757 3,613
Source: Advertisers’ Association, Data on Annual Advertising Expenditure by Platform (2005–2010), available at http://www.
rd.org.tr/ (accessed 12 February 2011).
Print media account for 26 percent of advertising spending, while spending for television advertising is at its 
peak with 56 percent, according to the 2010 statistics. Newspapers and magazines also make money from 
sales and subscription revenues. 
Th ere are no statistics available on the amount of income private broadcasters receive from cable and satellite 
subscriptions.
127. Financial Times, “Turkey: Advertising Spending Rises”; also at Mediacat Online, http://www.medyatava.net/haber.asp?id=77689 (accessed 
2 February 2012).
128. Milliyet Daily, “Reklamlarda Kriz Yok, Çift Haneli Büyümeye Devam” (Th e Unstoppable Growth of Advertising Sector), 30 January 2012, at http://
ekonomi.milliyet.com.tr/reklamlarda-kriz-yok-cift-haneli-buyumeye-devam/ekonomi/ekonomiyazardetay/30.01.2012/1495574/default.
htm (accessed 2 February 2012).
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Table 16.
Advertising expenditure, by platform, % of total, 2005–2010
Platforms 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Television 48.6 51.6 53.2 52.0 52.3 55.3
Press (newspapers) 34.3 32.7 29.9 29.3 27.0 23.1
Press (magazines) 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.5 2.7 4.3
Radio 3.7 5.7 7.1 7.4 7.2 2.1
Outdoor 4.8 3.6 3.6 3.3 3.2 7.0
Cinema 3.5 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2
Internet 1.4 1.3 1.3 3.1 6.5 7.0
Source: Advertisers’ Association, Data on Annual Advertising Expenditure by Platform (2005–2010), available at http://www.
rd.org.tr/ (accessed 12 February 2011)
6.2.2 Other Sources of Funding
Th ere is currently no information on other sources of media income available. TRT relies mainly on the 
electricity levy, and conglomerates depend on transferring income from their lucrative businesses to loss-
making outlets. In 2009, for instance, Aksiyon Magazine reported that Çalık Holding transferred its income 
from television advertisements to Yeni Aktüel magazine, as its sales started to fall far below expectations.
Mustafa Sönmez, Cumhuriyet columnist and Bianet.org contributor, explains that the funding resources of 
media companies remain obscure. He claims that DMG, which receives the lion’s share of media advertising 
and newspaper sales despite its deteriorating relations with the government, still sustains ﬁ nancial losses.129 
Despite the well-known close relationship between Feza Group, Samanyolu AŞ, and Gülen, no information 
is available on the amount or sources of funding provided for these companies.130 
6.3 Media Business Models
6.3.1 Changes in Media Business Models
How far television ratings have suﬀ ered as a result of the increasing popularity of video-sharing websites like 
YouTube and iTunes, as well as online television channels, is almost impossible to judge: there is no reliable 
audience research available.131 Th ere are also no data available on television stations’ income from their online 
activities.
129. Cumhuriyet, “Medya Ne Kadar Zararda?” (What is the Total Loss of Media Owners?), 19 April 2010.
130. Fethullah Gülen oﬃ  cial, “Hocaefendi Medyası Dünyaya Açılıyor” (Gülen Media Goes Global), 25 December 2006, available at http://tr.fgulen.
com/content/view/12617/11 (accessed 2 November 2010).
131. NY Times, “Brieﬁ ng: Nielsen to Purchase all Net Ratings Shares, Technology & Media, International Herald Tribune,” 5 February 2007, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/05/technology/05iht-techbrief.4479259.html?_r=1 (accessed 2 April 2011).
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Th ere is more evidence about newspaper sales—but still not much. Th e highly popular news website, named 
IV. Kuvvet Medya (Dorduncukuvvetmedya.com) has been tracking the circulations of the biggest-selling 
newspapers week by week since 2010 and its ﬁ gures show a gradual but signiﬁ cant decline in newspaper sales, 
though how far this has been due to the internet remains debatable.132
As elsewhere in the world, the question of how print media should operate online is much discussed in Turkey. 
Several major media companies, among them DMG and Ciner Yayın Holding, publish the entire content 
of their print newspapers online, but many commentators question the eﬀ ectiveness of this. A columnist on 
the Star, Ergun Babahan, wrote of the “negative” inﬂ uence of the internet on traditional newspapers, and 
suggested that “media company managers should upgrade the quality of content of online news websites, and 
invest in tabloid publishing.”133 Th e web editor of Yeni Şafak, Melih Bayram Dede, suggested that newspapers 
should be made available via paid subscription, as already being done by Taraf.134 Critics of the subscription 
model say that there is no evidence that it would attract suﬃ  cient readers to oﬀ set the decline in online 
advertising revenue that would accompany the inevitable decline in traﬃ  c that goes with erecting a pay-wall. 
Equally, however, there is no evidence that oﬀ ering content free in order to maximize online advertising 
income provides suﬃ  cient revenue to make up for sales lost through digital migration.
6.4 Assessments
Th e concentration and lack of transparency of media ownership are among the most worrying factors aﬀ ecting 
media independence in Turkey. Digitization is already changing consumption patterns and business models, 
but it will do little to alter the market dominance of a handful of conglomerates, and concentration looks set 
to increase with the relaxation of rules on foreign ownership of Turkish media outlets. It is worth mentioning 
that Habertürk, the primary new actor in the Turkish media scene, has challenged the monopolistic structure 
of media ownership in Turkey with both its traditional and its online outlets. However, the primary digital 
actors are still the online services of major traditional conglomerates like DMG, which puts the inﬂ uence of 
digital-only platforms in question. 
However, foreign investment may encourage the creation of a more diverse media environment. Th e entrance 
of Al Jazeera is a crucial development, implying the future involvement of further foreign investors in 
traditional and digital media. Foreign investors may now own up to 50 percent of Turkish media service 
providers, as they are now called, instead of 25 percent, and they may now forge partnerships with two 
national operators rather than one.
132. Dördüncü Kuvvet Medya, “Çok Satan GazetelerinHepsiTirajKaybetti!” (All Newspapers with High Circulation Sell Fewer Copies), 14 December 
2010, at http://dorduncukuvvetmedya.com/2728-cok-satan-gazetelerin-hepsi-tiraj-kaybetti.html (accessed 29 December 2010).
133. Star, “Gazetelerin İnternet Sitesi Olmalı mı?” (Should Newspapers Have Online Versions?), 20 October 2010, at http://www.stargazete.com/
gazete/yazar/ergun-babahan/pkk-turkiye-gercegi-303139.htm (accessed 27 December 2010).
134. Dördüncü Kuvvet Medya, “Gazete Yöneticilerinin İnternet Sancısı” (Newspaper Managers’ Internet Nuisance), 20 October 2010, at http://dor-
duncukuvvetmedya.com/2453-gazete-yoneticilerinin-internet-sancisi.html (accessed 27 December 2011).
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As the great number of local and national newspapers and the buoyancy of circulations indicate, the traditional 
press remains important. But digitization appears to be eating into sales, and there is a live debate about the 
best business model for newspapers to adopt in response.
Some publishers have decided to opt for publishing everything from their print editions online in an attempt 
to maximize online advertising revenue, which is the main source of income for media companies in Turkey. 
Others are more cautious, suggesting that some sort of subscription model is the solution, and one low-
budget daily national newspaper has already started online subscriptions for its readers in its eﬀ orts to raise 
additional money. 
Th e external sources of media funding remain secret. Although it is asserted that major media conglomerates 
depend on lucrative businesses to recover the ﬁ nancial costs of their loss-making outlets, the income sources 
of many media companies remain uncertain. 
As many websites have continued to copy the online content of national newspapers without paying for 
the copyrights, paid subscription still does not seem to be an eﬃ  cient way of recovering the losses of media 
companies due to the decreasing sales of traditional newspapers. Th e issue still stands as a debatable problem 
in search of a proper solution for the revival of the media in Turkey.
Th e future funding for TRT is another question. While it is estimated that it will keep depending on its 
income from sales taxes and advertising, public pressure may end the TRT levy on electricity bills, which may 
result in it seeking alternative resources for media income either on analog or digital platforms. 
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7. Policies, Laws, and Regulators
7.1 Policies and Laws
7.1.1 Digital Switch-over of Terrestrial Transmission
7.1.1.1 Access and Aﬀ ordability
Oﬃ  cial assurances that digital broadcasting will be available and aﬀ ordable to all have been issued periodically 
since 2006, when Zahid Akman, head of RTÜK, declared that the quality of broadcasting would improve by 
switching over to digital terrestrial broadcasting, and the transition would be completed by 2015.135
His colleague, Taha Yücel, indicated that consumers would be able to view both analog and digital transmissions 
until 80 percent of the audience had been provided with the means to receive digital terrestrial broadcasting, 
adding that set-top boxes would cost TL 50–100 (US$ 75–150 at 2006 prices).136 Despite these assurances, 
nothing has been done to ensure that economically disadvantaged people will be able to receive digital broadcasts.137
7.1.1.2 Subsidies for Equipment
Th ere is no state scheme to subsidize set-top boxes and digital television sets for poor households. But there are 
promotions by companies, such as Türksat Teledünya, which charges TL 105 (US$ 52.50) for set-top boxes, 
with free activation and installation.138 Teledünya’s digital broadcasts are currently available in 21 Turkish 
cities, including Ankara, Istanbul, Mersin, Manisa, Adana, Samsun, and Denizli.139 Teledünya charges its 
customers TL 9.50 (US$ 4.98) per month for its 112-channel Basic Pack, an extra TL 7.50 (US$ 4.15) for 
its Movie Pack, and TL 11.50 (US$ 6.36) for the HD Movie Pack.
135. RTÜK, “Televizyon Yayıncılığında Yeni Dönem” (A New Era in Television Broadcasting), 21 June 2006, at http://www.rtuk.org.tr/sayfalar/Icerik-
Goster.aspx?icerik_id=9b16fec3-55ce-4e59-b908-0600d8857480 (accessed 2 September 2011) (hereafter RTÜK, “Televizyon Yayıncılığında 
Yeni Dönem”).
136. Hürriyet Daily, “Dijital TV yayını 50 YTL’ye ‘karaya’ iniyor” (Digital TV Will Start to Operate for TL 50), 22 June 2006, at http://www.hurriyet.
com.tr/ekonomi/4624274.asp?m=1 (accessed 5 September 2011).
137. RTÜK, “Televizyon Yayıncılığında Yeni Dönem.”
138. TeleDünya, “HD STB Promotion,” at http://www.teledunya.tv/hdstb.html (accessed 27 December 2011).
139. TeleDünya, “Only TL 9,5 per month,” at http://www.teledunya.tv/ydunya.html (accessed 13 August 2011).
M A P P I N G  D I G I T A L  M E D I A     T U R K E Y6 6
By comparison with Türksat’s cable television network subscription price of TL 43 (US$ 86) for installation, 
Teledünya’s oﬀ er is a reasonable deal. Despite the high price for installation, these prices are aﬀ ordable for the 
majority of the audience.
7.1.1.3 Legal Provisions on Public Interest
Law no. 6112 on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and their Media Services ensures 
provision for the public interest with the statement that the main purpose of all media service providers should 
be to inform, entertain, and educate citizens. Th e law, which came into force in February 2011, does not provide 
any other statements on the switch-over of terrestrial platforms and transparent criteria (see also section 6.1.1).
7.1.1.4 Public Consultation
Th ere has been no public consultation on digitization policies and the public remains largely unaware of them. 
For information exchange, market intelligence, and training, public consultation would be beneﬁ cial for the 
representation of diverse interests that would result in the creation of a more eﬃ  cient civic engagement. Th ere 
is no trace of civil society engagement in the digitization process at present.
7.1.2 The Internet
7.1.2.1 Regulation of News on the Internet
All internet content is governed by the Law on the Regulation of Broadcasts on the Internet and on the Fight 
against Crimes Committed through the Internet, known as the Internet Law (no. 5651), which entered 
into force in 2007. Th e law, which makes no distinction between the online content of traditional media 
and other internet content, deﬁ nes the obligations of all internet content, hosting, and access providers. It 
identiﬁ es the following nine internet crimes: encouraging suicide; sexual abuse of children; facilitation of 
use of drugs or stimulants; provision of substances that are dangerous for health; obscenity; prostitution; 
gambling; sports betting and games; and crimes committed against Atatürk. 
Access and internet service providers (ISPs) are regulated by Art. 6, which requires them to obtain an activity 
certiﬁ cate from the Telecommunication Board (Telekomünikasyon İletişim Başkanlığı, TİB), which is part of 
BTK.140 As of November 2009, 109 ISPs had done so. Th is certiﬁ cate is obligatory for ISPs before oﬀ ering 
services. Operators without an activity certiﬁ cate are subject to ﬁ nes of TL 3,000–15,000 (US$ 1,650–8,250). 
Access providers are required to take down any illegal content published by any of their customers once 
made aware of it by the TİB, or if subjected to a court order. Access providers do not need to monitor the 
information that goes through their networks, nor do they have any general obligation to actively seek facts 
or circumstances indicating illegal activity with regards to the transmitted data.141
140. For a list of the ISPs, see http://www.tib.gov.tr/dokuman/ES_listesi.html (accessed 12 August 2011).
141. Yaman Akdeniz, “Report of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and Internet Censorship in Turkey,” at www.osce.org/
fom/41091 (accessed 12 August 2011) (hereafter Yaman Akdeniz, “Report of the OSCE Representative”).
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Art. 3 of the 2007 Internet Law imposes a duty on all content, hosting, and access providers to reveal their 
identity to the consumers of their services through their websites.142 Any provider failing to comply faces an 
administrative ﬁ ne imposed by the TİB of TL 2,000–10,000 (US$ 1,100–5,530).
If complaints are received by the Telecommunications Board (Telekomünikasyon İletişim Başkanlığı, TİB), 
access to websites with inappropriate content can be banned by court decisions. Th e TİB also has the 
authority to ban websites, for which courts have passed generally guilty verdicts in crimes against child 
abuse and obscenity, and it can order ISPs to block access to global websites if their content has been found 
“inappropriate” by the Criminal Court.143
Besides Law no. 5651, Law no. 5846 on Intellectual and Artistic Works has also been used to receive blocking 
orders through the judicial courts for MySpace, Last.fm, and Akilli.tv, arguing that these sites had been used 
to illegally publish works which users did not own legal rights in.144
Th e Law on Fighting Terrorism (no. 3713) sanction of a prison sentence for “separatist propaganda” and the 
Penal Code (no. 5237) both relate directly to the internet. While these laws do not reference the internet 
speciﬁ cally, they apply to it as laws of general application. Th e Penal Code (no. 5237), adopted in 2005, 
has several provisions signiﬁ cantly curtailing media freedom. Th e law criminalizes all activities encouraging 
disobedience by military personnel (Art. 319); alienating the public from the military (Art. 318); insulting 
the president (Art. 299), the government, and military or security forces (Art. 301); inciting crime (Art. 
214); praising crime and criminals (Art. 215); inciting hatred and animosity (Art. 216); and inciting people 
to disobedience of the law (Art. 217). Th e sentences under Arts 213–217 and 299 are increased by a half and 
one third, respectively, where any of the oﬀ ences are committed through the media, including the internet. 
A 2008 human rights report on Turkey stated that the government has been limiting freedom of expression 
via constitutional restrictions and laws, especially on active and controversial debates such as the Turkish–
Armenian conﬂ ict, political Islam, the EU membership process, and the role of the military.145 While cases 
of preventing incitement of hatred are regarded as legal according to the constitution, practices like banning 
websites with inappropriate content such as insulting the president and Turkish identity are also regarded 
as being within the same category, which are particularly enforced with regard to online media. In October 
2010, a teacher residing in Çorum was dismissed for insulting the prime minister on his Facebook proﬁ le 
with the status “I will say No to the referendum” on constitutional amendment.146 Halil Özbent, the chair 
142. Yaman Akdeniz, “Report of the OSCE Representative.”
143. Yaman Akdeniz, “Report of the OSCE Representative.”
144. Yaman Akdeniz, “Report of the OSCE Representative.”
145. BIA, “Media Monitoring Report 2009, First Quarter,” at http://bianet.org/english/freedom-of-expression/116107-bias-media-monitoring-re-
port-2009-ﬁ rst-quarter (accessed 2 January 2011).
146. Radikal, “Facebook’ta Başbakana Hakaret Edersin, Ha!” (How Could You Dare to Insult the Prime Minister on Facebook!), 24 October 2010, 
at http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&Date=24.10.2010&ArticleID=1025320&CategoryID=77 (accessed 12 
January 2011).
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of the Çorum branch of Eğitim-SEN,147 criticized this decision and said the case revealed the government’s 
intolerance of public criticism.
According to the Reporters without Borders 2010 Report,148 Turkey ranks 138 out of 178 countries in 
terms of press freedom and freedom of expression. Th is poor record is mainly due to legislative obstacles 
to democracy and human rights as stated in the European Commission’s Turkey 2010 Progress Report.149 
Despite the May 2008 amendments to the notorious Art. 301 of the Turkish Criminal Code, this law is still 
used to put journalists under extreme pressure. Art. 301 was initially applied to punish every act endangering 
“Turkish identity” with prison sentences of up to three years. After the 2008 amendments, the relevant 
wording changed from “Turkish identity” to “Turkish nation” and the prison sentence was decreased to 
two years. Th e number of cases opened has also dropped signiﬁ cantly. However, many other provisions 
of criminal law still restrict freedom of expression. For instance, Art. 318 (oﬀ ences of discouraging people 
from military service), Arts 214, 216, 217, 218, and 220 (oﬀ ences against public order), Art. 305 (oﬀ ences 
against state security), Articles 312 and 314 (oﬀ ences against the constitutional order), and ﬁ nally Art. 226 
(obscenity oﬀ ences) are all currently used to punish journalists. Although the ruling party has expressed its 
extreme discomfort with the international pressure over press freedom, digitization has made the violations 
more transparent to the global community.
Law no. 5651 may have serious repercussions for a number of fundamental rights protected under the 
constitution and international human rights law. Th e blocking policy undoubtedly has a very strong impact on 
freedom of expression, which is one of the founding principles of democracy and is a violation of Art. 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Because of its legal and procedural deﬁ ciencies, Law no. 
5651 should be brought in line with international standards on freedom of expression, or otherwise abolished.
Under a new regulation announced by BTK on 22 February 2011, internet users were obliged to choose 
between one of four internet ﬁ ltering options on 22 November 2011: family, children, domestic, or standard. 
Although this regulation was due to come into eﬀ ect on 22 August 2011, it was revised on the recommendation 
of the Internet Council, a branch of the Transportation and Communications Ministry, and postponed to 22 
November 2011. Between 22 August and 22 November, the internet ﬁ ltering system was trialed, to test and 
compare the eﬀ ectiveness of diﬀ erent ﬁ ltering options.150 As expected, BTK launched the internet ﬁ ltering 
system in November 2011.151
147. Eğitim-SEN is a non-governmental organization working to protect teachers’ rights in Turkey.
148. Reporters Without Borders for Press Freedom, “2010 World Press Freedom Index,” 20 October 2010, available at http://www.rsf.org/IMG/
CLASSEMENT_2011/GB/C_GENERAL_GB.pdf (accessed 12 March 2011).
149. Turkey 2010 Progress Report: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges, accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and Council, Brussels.
150. Today’s Zaman, “BTK head: Internet regulation means safe Internet at no cost,” 24 October 2011, at http://www.todayszaman.com/news-
260822-btk-head-internet-regulation-means-safe-internet-at-no-cost.html (accessed 12 November 2011).
151. European Digital Rights, “Turkey Launches Internet Filtering Scheme,” 30 November 2011, at http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number9.23/
turkey-launches-ﬁ ltering-scheme (accessed 17 March 2012) (hereafter European Digital Rights, “Turkey Launches Internet Filtering Scheme”).
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7.1.2.2 Legal Liability for Internet Content
Content providers are regulated through Art. 4 of the 2007 Internet Law, which states that they are responsible 
for the content they create and publish on their websites. Th ey are not liable for third-party content that they 
provide links to unless they have adopted the content as their own or have deliberately aimed to make the 
content accessible. 
Under Art. 5, hosting providers are subject to a notice-based liability system. Th ey have no general obligation 
to monitor the information they store, nor do they have a general obligation actively to seek facts or 
circumstances indicating illegal activity. But they are obliged to remove from their sites illegal content once 
notiﬁ ed by TİB, or when subjected to a court order under Art. 8 of the Internet Law.152 Th e recent increase 
in the scope of internet regulation resulted in a higher number of websites banned in Turkey. According to a 
Report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), by the end of 2010 access to 
over 3,700 websites had been banned for acquiring inappropriate content in conﬂ ict with Law no. 5651.153 
Regarding recent restrictions, the author of the report, Yaman Akdeniz, a professor of law at the Istanbul Bilgi 
University, said that Law no. 5651 was nominally aimed at the protection of children and families, adding 
also that those restrictions only had a “self-deception eﬀ ect:” the ban has not prevented violations since access 
to restricted websites is still possible via servers providing anonymity, such as K Tunnel.154 (See section 7.3.1.)
7.2 Regulators
7.2.1 Changes in Content Regulation
In Law no. 6112 on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and their Media Services, which 
came into force in February 2011, the following regulations for news content are mentioned: 
 inappropriate (e.g. extremely manipulative) sound eﬀ ects and images cannot be used in news programs;
 TV and radio hosts should abstain from sharing speculative news content that is not validated by news 
agencies;
 news content on sensitive issues such as environment, security, and health should be presented in an 
impartial manner.155
152. European Digital Rights, “Turkey Launches Internet Filtering Scheme.”
153. Yaman Akdeniz, “Report of the OSCE Representative.”
154. BBC Türkçe, “OSCE: Over 3,700 Websites Banned in Turkey,” 19 January 2010, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2010/01/100119_
osce_turkey.shtml (accessed 12 April 2011).
155. Habertürk, “RTÜK’ten hatırlatma” (A Reminder From RTÜK), 18 March 2011, available at http://www.haberturk.com/medya/haber/611637-
rtukten-hatirlatma (accessed 19 April 2011).
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Th e new law also mentions regulations on tele-shopping, consumer orientation, exploitation of women and 
children, and product placement on TV. Professor Dr Davut Dursun, the chair of RTÜK, explained that the 
new law complies with the legislation of the EU.156
7.2.2 Regulatory Independence
RTÜK is responsible for monitoring and regulating radio and television broadcasts in Turkey. Founded 
in 1994 and located in Ankara, the independence of RTÜK is highly controversial, as of the nine board 
members appointed by the Parliament, ﬁ ve have to be nominated by the party or parties in power, and 
four by opposition parties. Moreover, the chairman of RTÜK reports directly to the prime minister, which 
makes government intervention easier. Th e government can still have inﬂ uence over the decisions approved 
by the chairman even after the appointment of the chairman to the council, which makes the administrative 
structure of RTÜK unique to Turkey. 
Th e regulatory and supervising body of telecommunication services in Turkey is BTK, which is under the 
Ministry of Transportation, indicating its dependency on one of the main bodies of the government. Its 
institutional structure is open to government inﬂ uence, as two candidates are nominated by the ministry for 
the key positions of chairman of the board, representative of telecommunication services, and representative 
of wireless services.157 Th e European Competitive Telecommunication Association’s (ECTA) 2009 report on 
national regulatory authorities also indicated that BTK’s regulatory framework was ineﬃ  cient at improving 
competition in the market, and suggested that it lacked the elasticity to balance the expectations of the 
private sector and those of the government.158 
7.2.3 Digital Licensing
Broadcast licensing is the responsibility of RTÜK, which has the authority for national and regional frequency 
planning and for giving permissions and licenses to entrepreneurs who apply for them. RTÜK conducts its 
activities within the framework of the principles of the European Convention on Transfrontier Television.159 
It also uses the same procedures for national, local, and regional licenses for both radio and television, as well 
as for analog and digital broadcasting, regardless of platform.
According to Law no. 3984 on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and their Broadcasts 
that came into force in 1994, all media service providers had to participate in a frequency allocation tender 
that RTÜK could cancel upon the request of the National Security Council in cases of national security 
threats. Th e new Law no. 6112 of February 2011 expanded the license criteria by stating that a media service 
provider should be active for at least one year, and must meet the tender speciﬁ cations in order to obtain a 
156. RTÜK News, “Statement of Prof. Dr. Davut Dursun,” 2011, at http://www.rtuk.org.tr/sayfalar/IcerikGoster.aspx?icerik_id=322b9d48-0f66-
4ae5-b354-2ac3f552f261 (accessed 6 June 2011).
157. Tamer Cetin (ed.), Th e Political Economy of Regulation in Turkey”, Springer, New York, 2011.
158. European Competitive Telecommunication Association (ECTA), “Regulatory Scorecard, 2009,” at http://www.ectaportal.com/en/upload/Sco-
recards/Regulatory_Scorecard_2009/ECTA%20Regulatory%20Scorecard%20Report%202009.pdf (accessed 16 November 2011).
159. RTÜK, “Avrupa Sınır Ötesi Televizyon Sözleşmesi” (Th e Transnational Television Directive), at http://www.rtuk.org.tr/sayfalar/IcerikGoster.
aspx?icerik_id=6ac52c35-c1e4-4c7f-9768-53b851dd1cae (accessed 12 October 2011).
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license from RTÜK. However, no information has yet been provided to clarify the tender speciﬁ cations that 
media service providers are expected to meet.
All terrestrial broadcasting services still hold de facto status, in terms of being issued licenses without public 
tender, and it is obligatory to receive a temporary certiﬁ cate from RTÜK. Th e non-transparent nature of 
licensing in Turkey has put the fairness of the system in question. 
7.2.4 Role of Self-regulatory Mechanisms
No self-regulatory mechanism has been established to set up standards for accountability and transparency in 
Turkey, although RTÜK organized a series of conferences on media literacy in 2006, encouraging the media 
companies to adopt initiatives such as the appointment of television ombudsmen and the establishment of 
industry-wide self-regulatory bodies.
Th ere are currently three main non-governmental journalists’ bodies involved in media regulation in Turkey, 
namely, the Turkish Press Council (Basın Konseyi), the Progressive Journalists’ Association (Çağdaş Gazeteciler 
Derneği), and the Journalists’ Association of Turkey (Türkiye Gazeteciler Cemiyeti). 
Th e Turkish Press Council is a non-governmental organization with its own charter,160 operating in 
coordination with the media service providers.
In one of the latest incidents, the council became actively involved in assessing complaints about a controversial 
column by Oktay Ekşi, the former chief columnist of Hürriyet and chairman of the council.161 Mr Ekşi 
received a warning from the board members of the council, following tense reactions to his controversial 
column. However, the controversy unexpectedly ended with the resignation of Ekşi from his position as chief 
columnist in October 2010, followed by his resignation from the council of his own will in January 2011. 
Following Mr Ekşi’s resignation, council oﬃ  cials stated that he had resigned in order not to compromise the 
independent status of the council.162 
Th e Progressive Journalists’ Association, a member of the International Journalists’ Federation, advocates the 
elimination of discriminatory content in Turkish media. Th e organization also has its own code of ethics, 
which is legally non-binding for its members.163 
Th e Journalists’ Association of Turkey was established in 1946 by a group of respected journalists of their 
time, including Sedat Simavi, the founder of Hürriyet. Th e association released its own code of ethics in 1960, 
remaining non-binding for the members.
160. Turkish Press Council Charter in English, at http://www.basinkonseyi.org.tr/lang_eng/charterOfCouncil.asp (accessed 17 November 2011).
161. Mr Ekşi wrote a column on government policy about erecting hydroelectrical power plants in Rize, using oﬀ ensive language which drew strong 
criticism from Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan.
162. DördüncüKuvvetMedya, “Oktay Ekşi Basın Konseyi Başkanlığı’ndan Ayrıldı” (Oktay Ekşi Resigns), at http://www.dorduncukuvvetmedya.
com/2901-oktay-eksi-basin-konseyi-baskanligi-ndan-ayrildi.html (accessed 2 January 2012).
163. “Çağdaş Gazeteciler Derneği, İlkelerimiz” (Our Principles), at http://www.cgd.org.tr/index.php?Did=6 (accessed 18 November 2011).
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Although there are also other journalist unions such as the Association of Economy Reporters (Ekonomi 
Muhabirleri Derneği), the Association of Photo Reporters (Foto Muhabirleri Derneği), and the Association of 
Parliamentary Reporters (Parlamento Muhabirleri Derneği), with their own codes of ethics, there is no uniﬁ ed 
code of ethics on journalism practices accepted by all these organizations. 
Th e Advertising Self-regulatory Board (Reklam Özdenetim Kurulu, RÖK),164 set up in 1994 by the members 
of the Advertisers’ Association (Reklamcılar Derneği), was established to assess complaints received about 
advertisements on air. It explains its role as follows: “Th e Turkish Association of Advertising Agencies and the 
media, request the correction of advertisements that they ﬁ nd violating the International Code of Advertising 
Practice. It will fulﬁ ll this function in a manner that is not based on any legal requirements but is a consequence 
of its public commitments motivated by the conscience of the responsibilities it has towards society.”165
Basing its code on the International Code of Advertising Practice, the RÖK deals with all kinds of complaints 
regarding misleading or incorrect advertisements and when necessary, initiates legal action. Decisions of the 
RÖK are binding on its members.166 It also collaborates closely with RTÜK and publishes the results of its 
deliberations on its oﬃ  cial website.
Th ere are other associations in the advertising sector with their own codes of ethics, such as the Turkish 
Association of Advertising Agencies (TAAA), (the international Advertising Association Turkey (IAA Turkey), 
and the Association of Advertisers (Reklamverenler Derneği).




Th e government’s conservative approach to market regulation has had several implications for the media 
market. A recent investigation reveals that authorities on various levels enforce the government’s powers over 
the regulators. RTÜK requested an investigation of Ulusal Kanal in March 2011, for mentioning references 
to the prime minister in WikiLeaks documents during a news program.167 TRT’s ad auction in March 2009 
also drew huge attention due to claims that the highest-bidding company had close ties with the government.
164. Advertising Self-regulatory Board, at http://www.rok.org.tr (accessed 16 May 2011).
165. Advertising Self-regulatory Board, at http://www.rok.org.tr (accessed 16 May 2011).
166. Advertising Self-regulatory Board, at http://rok.org.tr/eng/principles.asp?id=2#1 (accessed 17 May 2011).
167. Birgün Daily, “WikiLeaks Investigation by RTÜK Against Ulusal Kana,l, BirGün, 3 March 2011, at http://www.birgun.net/actuel_index.
php?news_code=1298996176&year=2011&month=03&day=01 (accessed 18 May 2011).
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Th e restrictive practices of regulatory authorities over digital platforms can be seen as obstacles that constrain 
the emergence of a fair signal distribution market in Turkey. Digitürk has been prosecuted by RTÜK for 
violating Law no. 4207 on Prevention and Control of the Harms of Tobacco Products by broadcasting ﬁ ve 
movies with smoking scenes. Th e regulator punished the digital broadcasting company with a ﬁ ne of TL 
250,000 during its meeting held on 16 February 2010. 
Th ere have been several cases in which regulators have been accused of being over-zealous. RTÜK’s role has 
so far mainly been in regulating analog broadcasting, the main exception being the digital platform Digitürk, 
which has been operating since 1999. Digitürk has received many notices from RTÜK, the most notable 
in 2005 after Digitürk’s movie channel, MovieMax, broadcast Kill Bill, which RTÜK said included violent 
scenes that might cause psychological damage to viewers.168 Digitürk oﬃ  cials deservedly claim that it is being 
persecuted by RTÜK because of its owners’ criticism of the government; RTÜK argues that it is simply 
enforcing the rules.
Th e government also recently started to exert pressure on digital media on the basis of current laws and 
regulations. Barış Yarkadaş, an online journalist working for the newspaper Gerçek Gündem (“Real Agenda”), 
may face a prison term of ﬁ ve years and four months, under Art. 299 of the Penal Code. His trial began on 3 
March 2010. Th e public prosecutor charged him with “insulting the President of the Republic,” and for the 
refusal to withdraw from his newspaper’s website a critical article posted by an internet user. Th e journalist 
faced multiple lawsuits, but was acquitted in September 2011.169
In 2010, Hacı Boğatekin, editor-in-chief of the Gergerﬁ rat.net news site, was sentenced to ﬁ ve years in 
prison for insulting and defaming Sadullah Ovacıklı, a local prosecutor. His son, Özgür Boğatekin, owner of 
Gergerﬁ rat.net, received a 14-month prison term after he intervened when two policemen assaulted a person 
on the street. Cumali Badur, an editor on the same news site, was ﬁ ned €1,500 after a column posted on the 
website in January 2008 mentioned that Mr Ovacıklı had ties with Fethullah Gülen, a religious community 
leader. Th ose three journalists have appealed their cases and the proceedings continue.
Digitization is a recent phenomenon in Turkey, and so an amended and constructive RTÜK Act, fostering 
technological development and operating independently of government, is expected in the coming years. 
7.3.2 The Regulator
Since its establishment in 1994, RTÜK has been the main regulator and license provider of television and 
radio broadcasting services. Although no tender has been initiated for the distribution of frequencies over 
the past 16 years which did not include an abuse of power by RTÜK, it is expected that 10-year licenses will 
be provided for newcomers entering the media market. In addition, renewed certiﬁ cates for current service 
168. “RTÜK Requires Digitürk To Defend Itself,” Haberpan, 15 April 2005, available at http://www.haberpan.com/rtuk-kill-bill-savunmasi-istedi-
haberi (accessed 19 November 2010).
169. Bianet, “Fincancı ve Yarkadaş Beraat Etti” (Fincancı and Yarkadaş Acquitted by the Court) 16 September 2011, at http://bianet.org/bianet/
ifade-ozgurlugu/132754-ﬁ ncanci-ve-yarkadas-beraat-etti (accessed 17 November 2011).
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providers will be issued with the implementation of the new Law no. 6112 on the Establishment of Radio 
and Television Enterprises and their Media Services. 
7.3.3 Other Forms of Interference
Th ere are currently no forms of extra-legal government pressure on analog and digital content providers. 
7.4 Assessments
Th e framework of media policy, law, and regulation has been adapted for the digital age in certain key areas 
such as gambling and child pornography, but not for cybercrimes such as hacking. Law no. 5651 on the 
Regulation of Broadcasts on the Internet and on the Fight against Crimes Committed through the Internet 
are scarcely equal to the power of regulatory authorities, as the TİB has full authority to ban global websites 
with inappropriate content without the need for judicial approval. 
Th e new Law no. 6112 on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and their Media Services 
paved the way for the regulation of digital radio and television broadcasts, although it does not draw a 
distinction between the duties of analog and digital media service providers. RTÜK still plays a key role in 
the regulation of television and radio broadcasting. However, the composition of the institutional board 
members puts its independence in question. Th e de facto status of terrestrial broadcasting channels also 
indicates the need for new regulation to organize tenders on a regular basis that should draw a distinction 
between digital and analog media service providers. Moreover, the regulator should undertake public 
consultation to support pluralism and diversity throughout the revision and restructuring of television and 
radio broadcasting regulations. 
Th e recent legal forms of interference in digital platforms pose a threat to the freedom of journalists in digital 
media. While online journalism has its own limitations in terms of having access to ﬁ nancial resources and 
the authenticity of the content provided, the application of the Penal Code to online journalists is having a 
corrosive eﬀ ect on the independence and healthy development of online journalism in the country.
 




In the last ﬁ ve years, there have been various positive developments as a result of digitization.
 Th e increasing rate of internet penetration, as well as the rising popularity of mobile news services, 
indicates the growing public interest in the newly emerging technologies and services oﬀ ered. 
 As a consequence of the healthy competition among mobile phone service providers, Turkcell, Vodafone, 
and Avea, service fees have become more reasonable and aﬀ ordable for millions of people in Turkey, 
which has resulted in a growth in the number of alternative news packages and subscribers.
 Despite the lack of eﬀ ective, regularly updated, and visited news blogs in Turkey, informed estimates 
indicate a high number of bloggers. Blogging on issues other than news, such as lifestyle and fashion, 
is quite common. Digitization and Web 2.0 services have also made domestic political aﬀ airs more 
transparent in the eyes of global media actors as well as international organizations.
 Th e public broadcaster TRT began to broadcast in Kurdish in January 2009 on TRT 6, and various 
overseas-based Kurdish television stations continue to broadcast via satellite. Th is is an important step 
towards the recognition and acknowledgment of Kurdish culture in Turkey.
 Digitization has allowed the emergence of alternative news platforms online, although the authenticity 
of most news content can hardly compete with the online editions of printed newspapers. Access to 
ﬁ nancial resources is a huge obstacle for online journalists and content providers.
8.1.2 Negative Developments
 Th e high concentration of media ownership, growing media partisanship, the tendency to recruit star 
columnists rather than invest in investigative reporters, and abuses of legislation are the major obstacles 
to the overall democratization and better functioning of media in Turkey. 
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 Since coming to power in 2002, AKP has used legal loopholes to conﬁ scate and sell various independent 
media organizations to party supporters, thus changing the media landscape. In 2002, pro-AKP businesses 
owned less than 20 percent of Turkish media outlets, while today, pro-government partisan entrepreneurs 
own around half of them. Th is is a major threat to democracy.
 Digitization has started to eat into the sales of traditional newspapers, resulting in lower advertising 
and sales revenues. Despite the fact that advertising on digital platforms oﬀ ers an alternative source of 
funding for printed media outlets, even the major media conglomerates still suﬀ er from their loss-making 
digital businesses.
 Although it is well known that advertising is the main source of media income for private media 
companies in Turkey, the non-transparent nature of relationships between advertisers and the media 
makes it diﬃ  cult to determine what the real sources of income of media conglomerates are.
 Th e digital switch-over in television and radio broadcasting, planned for 2014, remains a mystery, as no 
detailed information has been provided for public discussion of the progress of the switch-over or the 
potential consequences of digitization for citizens and the media industry itself.
 Th ere are growing concerns about increasing homophobic and ultra-nationalist discourses in print 
and digital media, which has also resulted in the persecution of journalists from diﬀ erent minority 
backgrounds.
 Th e roles of RTÜK and BTK have started to become unclear since the start of digitization processes. 
Although RTÜK is the body for regulating radio and television broadcasting, BTK also plays a crucial 
role in spectrum frequency allocation, as well as in the regulation of audiovisual content broadcast online.
 Th e TİB, operating under the supervision of BTK, has excessive authority with regard to determining the 
inappropriateness of suspected global websites outside Turkish jurisdiction.
 Th e regulation of analog and digital broadcasting has melded into one with the new Law no. 6112 on the 
Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and their Media Services. Th ere has been no public 
discussion conducted on the issue, as the majority of the population has not been made aware of the 
anticipated digital broadcasting services.
8.2 Media Tomorrow
Digitization of media content will continue to change the Turkish media landscape with technological 
developments. UGC, along with the wide use of mobile phones, will oﬀ er a more diverse news media sector. 
Th e victory of the AKP in the general elections of June 2011 brought new concerns about new and concentrated 
moves to muzzle the opposition media. Taking the political establishment’s interference in the structure of 
mainstream media into consideration, this will deﬁ nitely damage diversity in the media environment and 
harm the democratization process. 
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As a result of recent changes in the law that allow foreign companies an increased ownership share of Turkish 
media outlets, new global players will probably enter the broadcasting market.
Competition among mobile phone companies will be more rigorous and the prices will keep decreasing 
gradually.
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